

WBS Case Collection: Summary by Subject Area

Case Title	Year	Subject Areas
ECONOMICS		
Competition Commission Case Series: 1999-2009 Background Note	2010	Economics
The Competition Act of 1998 came into force in South Africa on 1 September 1999, and enabled the establishment of three bodies: the Competition Commission (the Commission), The Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) and the Competition Appeal Court (CAC). The Commission's main responsibility would be to investigate mergers and anti-competitive behaviour. Most cases would be decided in the Tribunal, while the mandate of the CAC was to review any decision of the Tribunal or consider an appeal arising from the Tribunal. The CAC was able to make judgements or give orders, including to confirm, amend or set aside a decision or order of the Competition Tribunal or remit a matter to the Tribunal for a further hearing on any appropriate terms.		
Competition Commission Case Series: Phodclinic's Acquisition of New Protector: Increasing Concentration?	2010	Economics
On 31 October 2006, executives at the Council for Medical Schemes (CMS) and private hospital group Netcare were eager to hear the Competition Tribunal's decision regarding the acquisition of the New Protector Group hospitals by Phodclinics (Pty) Ltd (a division of the Medi-Clinic Group) and DHJ Defty. Phodclinics had made the bid in 2005 after New Protector had been placed under provisional liquidation in late 2004. On 3 March 2006, the Competition Commission had recommended to the Tribunal that the transaction be approved without conditions. However, the CMS was concerned that, if the acquisition went ahead, it would increase concentration in the private hospital market and thereby fuel already-unacceptable price increases in the market. Dr Simon Roberts, chief economist at the Competition Commission, noted that the key to the "competitive dynamics in this sector was understanding who the sellers and who the buyers are – that is, the sellers are the private hospitals and the buyers, essentially the medical schemes". He added, "Fundamentally, the medical schemes, faced by an oligopoly, would want <i>more</i> competition in the sector." Netcare, on the other hand, as he pointed out, was a competitor to Medi-Clinic, and was more concerned about its competitive position in the sector that was dominated by itself (30.4% share), Life Healthcare (27.7% share) and Medi-Clinic (24.5%). At a pre-hearing in March 2006, the CMS, private hospital group Netcare and medical scheme administrator Supreme Health indicated that they wanted to intervene to argue against the acquisition. Permission was granted and the subsequent hearings took place during September and October 2006. Awaiting the Tribunal's ruling, the CMS and Netcare now reflected on whether the Tribunal would support their contentions.		
Competition Commission Case Series: South African Airways (2005)	2010	Economics
In July 2005, the BA/Comair (Comair) executives were eagerly awaiting the Competition Tribunal's decision in the case brought by the Competition Commission against South African Airways (Pty) Ltd (SAA), South Africa's dominant domestic airline. The case had been brought on behalf of the Nationwide Group, a domestic air travel rival to SAA. Nationwide lodged its complaint in October 2000, contending that, since 1999, SAA's incentives schemes to travel agents were so attractive as to force travel agents into selling SAA domestic travel tickets to the exclusion of Nationwide. Comair had lodged a similar complaint in October 2003, starting from the same period, but alleging that the incentives were continuing. Its case was yet to be heard. Would the Tribunal judge SAA's schemes as anti-competitive, thus paving the way for Comair's case?		
Industrial Relations in South Africa: Labour Laws, Labour Institutions and Political Disillusionment	2015	Economics, Environment of Business, Human Resources
In 2014, South Africa experienced its longest and costliest strike ever: a five-month stoppage in the platinum sector that cast doubt on the institutions and culture of the country's labour relations framework. After the strike came to an end in the late June, the National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac) convened a meeting to discuss ways of preventing further violent and protracted industrial action. Among the questions confronting delegates at this gathering was whether labour unrest could be addressed by altering the laws and institutions regulating strikes. Or would any such reforms prove largely futile in the absence of political and economic change?		
National Development Plan: The Outlook in 2016	2016	Economics

At the beginning of 2016, South Africa faced what Songezo Zibi, outgoing editor of <i>Business Day</i> , termed a “perfect storm”. President Jacob Zuma’s December 2015 decision to replace finance minister Nhlanelo Nene with David van Rooyen, an African National Congress (ANC) backbencher, had dealt the country its biggest financial blow since the start of democracy in 1994. Nene’s dismissal caused the value of local stocks and bonds to decline by half a trillion rand, according to one estimate, while the currency fell to a record low of R15.39 to the dollar. Although Zuma agreed three days later to replace Van Rooyen with former finance minister Pravin Gordhan, the rand continued to slide, reaching a new low of R17.99 to the dollar in mid-January 2016.		
Netcare Breast Care Centre of Excellence: What Opportunity in African Medical Tourism?	2013	Economics, International Business, Business in Africa
In August 2006, Dr Richard Friedland, the chief executive officer of Netcare Holdings, which operated the largest private hospital network in South Africa, was looking at the findings of research into the opportunity that medical tourists from Africa presented for the group’s Breast Care Centre of Excellence. Traditional thought was that because poverty was so widespread in Africa, the possibility of attracting medical tourists from Africa to South Africa was minimal. Reading the report, Friedland now wondered whether this was indeed the case – and, if not, how the centre could exploit the opportunity such tourism presented.		
Poultry Tariffs: Levelling the Playing Field or Rewarding Inefficiency?	2015	Economics, Environment of Business
In July 2013, Siyabulela Tsengwiwe – chief commissioner of the International Trade Administration Commission of South Africa (ITAC) – and ITAC commissioners met to make a final determination on a highly contentious customs tariff application. The South African Poultry Association (SAPA) had asked for increased duties across a range of chicken products, claiming that cheap imports were threatening the survival of local and regional producers. The application was opposed by the Association of Meat Importers and Exporters (AMIE), on the grounds that it was intended to protect a sector with questionable ethics and an outdated business model. Tsengwiwe and the commissioners had to decide which argument carried more weight in light of the government’s wish to support agriculture in a frequently inequitable global trading environment, while ensuring that this support did not come at the expense of the poor.		
Poultry Tariffs: Levelling the Playing Field or Rewarding Inefficiency? Epilogue	2015	Economics, Environment of Business, International Business
The International Trade Administration Commission of South Africa (ITAC) submitted its recommendation on the South African Poultry Association’s (SAPA) appeal for increased tariffs on 5 August 2013 and on 30 September 2013 the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) announced that SAPA had got its wish for two of the five broiler under consideration. Compromise tariffs were introduced for the remaining three products (see table below). The DTI said that it had sought to take into account the market share of imports of the various broilers products, and the extent to which domestic producers were disadvantaged by the prices of imports - all while trying to prevent poor consumers from being unduly affected by tariff-related price increases. The department indicated that new tariffs were intended to allow for a “fair and reasonable profit” to domestic producers that would prompt further investment in the industry.		
Regulate or Motivate? A Salt Reduction Strategy for Processed Food in South Africa	2013	Economics, Environment of Business
Six months had passed since the South African government had gazetted draft regulations on salt content in food. Now, in December 2012, the Minister of Health, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, was reviewing the submissions received on the proposed laws. As the comments had come in from individuals, corporates, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academics, the public health sector and civil society, Motsoaledi had realised that he would be facing some resistance to his department’s proposals. Yet, he had long felt that the health and broader socio-economic impacts of excessive salt consumption in South Africa were too high, and that salt intake should therefore be brought in line with international best practice. The question was whether it was better to regulate or motivate?		
Regulating Hawala: Informal Remittances Post 9/11	2013	Economics
In 2010, the officials of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) were reviewing the problems of formalising informal financial systems in developing countries, and specifically addressing the hawala system in Africa. Hawala was a highly popular form of remittance transfer, especially where there were no banks or the banking system failed to offer clients ease of access and competitive costs. However, hawala was open to misuse as a means for both money laundering and the funding of terrorism. They wondered if and how the FATF could address these problems and whether its existing recommendations and interventions were sufficient.		
South Africa: The Battle for Social and Economic Policy	2008	Economics
On Saturday 13 January 2007, the South African president, Thabo Mbeki, stepped up to the podium at a mass rally of African National Congress (ANC) supporters in Witbank, Mpumalanga to deliver the annual January 8 Statement of the ANC National Executive Committee (NEC). Although its purpose was to celebrate the 95th anniversary of the ANC, the event also provided an opportunity for the ANC leadership to project a united front after a year of turmoil within South Africa’s ruling political party.		
South African Budget 2018: Walking a Fiscal Tightrope	2017	Economics

In December 2017, as South Africa's minister of finance, Malusi Gigaba, and the Treasury continued putting together the country's 2018 budget, the country seemed perilously close to a fiscal cliff. Dismal economic growth and failures to contain government spending threatened to push the national debt to unsustainable levels – a situation compounded by public mismanagement and pervasive corruption in the form of “state capture”. Gigaba had to find a way of halting the decline of South Africa's finances while ensuring that the fiscus continued in its central role of supporting the poor.		
ENTREPRENEURSHIP		
Altis Biologics: From Labs to Riches?	2009	Entrepreneurship
Doctor Nicolaas Duneas was in a quandary: as he sat in his dishevelled office at the Tshwane University of Technology (TUT), he pondered the future of his company Altis Biologics. Founded in 2002, Altis was a small biotechnology company specialising in bone regeneration. Duneas was a trusted expert in his field, and Altis represented his life's work. Now, in July 2009, the company was poised in a kind of no-man's land. Duneas still needed to complete one more set of clinical trials before he could take his product to market, and for that he needed significant capital. Feeling like a very small fish in the big pond of global pharmaceuticals, Duneas wondered just how he was going to find the right funding and strategic partners to expand his business. Was he right to launch his product locally first? And was he being too ambitious by setting his sights on the overseas market?		
Altis Biologics: From Labs to Riches? Update	2017	Entrepreneurship
In January 2017, Dr Nicolaas Duneas, founder and chief executive officer of Altis Biologics – a small, South African-based biotechnology company specialising in bone regeneration – was beginning to wonder whether he had chosen the right strategy for commercialising his technology. Bone regeneration was necessary when broken or damaged bones could not heal themselves and surgeons had to use a catalyst to enable the process. In the early 2000s, Duneas had developed a catalyst derived from humanised porcine bone, which provided a less expensive, more accessible and more scalable alternative to those derived from human bone and synthetic sources. (See Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 .)		
Amanz'abantu: Water for the People	2001	Entrepreneurship, Social Entrepreneurship
Under Ive's leadership, the Amanz'abantu Consortium became a model of integrated water service delivery to the rural poor. However, government recognized a need for accelerated delivery. One approach was to award a Build, Operate, Train and Transfer (BoTT) government contract to selected consortia. As an entrepreneur working in the social sector, Ive and his colleagues experienced serious obstacles. The privatisation of this highly politicised and bureaucratic sector was the subject of considerable polemical debate. Ive considered the way forward.		
Andbeyond: From Africa to India and Beyond	2009	Entrepreneurship, International Business
Steven Fitzgerald looks relaxed as he arrives home from his fourth trip to South America this month. The chief executive officer of Andbeyond (originally Conservation Corporation Africa), a leader in luxury ecotourism, is taking his company to new climes. The company started in South Africa in 1990, spread its wings to other African countries and then ventured into India in 2004, where it has been successful – although with a few initial surprises. Now Fitzgerald has set his sights on South America. “Once you have seen lions, tigers in India are very enticing, as are jaguars, sloths and macaws in South America,” he says. But, he asks himself, what have we learnt from opening in India that we can take with us to South America? And what should we be doing in setting up in South America that we didn't do in India?		
Barbara Queally: A 180° Change in Leadership Style - Part A	2018	Entrepreneurship, Leadership, Human Resource Management, Organisational Behaviour
It was late afternoon in June 2016 and Barbara Queally, founder of Garden Morris, a company that specialised in chocolate products, confectionary ingredients, gifting and packaging, had just finished the first module on a leadership course for women at Wits Business School (WBS). This had been an intense day emotionally for Queally. Having received the results of an emotional quotient (EQ) test that she had completed prior to coming on the course, as she packed up her things an uncomfortable realisation was dawning on her – that her management style had been way too authoritarian. She wondered how she could become a more open, authentic leader – and, indeed, if it was possible to make this change.		
Barbara Queally: A 180° Change in Leadership Style Epilogue	2018	Entrepreneurship, Leadership, Human Resource Management, Organisational Behaviour

It had been difficult for Barbara Queally to go back to “school”, but she knew deep down that she had lost touch with her authentic self as a businesswoman and leader. The Women in Leadership course at Wits Business School (WBS), which ran from June to August 2016, revealed some uncomfortable truths for Queally. She realised, especially, that her listening skills were low, and she had all but lost the ability to empathise with others. Whereas many of her fellow students expressed how they struggled to take control and get their colleagues to listen, it was the opposite for Queally, who had to learn to give up control and listen to others. “I was a critical and closed person... I never gave my staff time to talk to me, I didn’t even let them have an idea,” recalled Queally.		
She decided to change the way she led her organisation, and it had worked. Taking the time to listen to her staff had led to some unexpected results. Towards the end of 2017, Queally looked back with astonishment at what they had achieved, in just 10 months, to help grow the company. (See Exhibit 1 for a profile of the company in 2017.)		
Barry Bernman: Assessing the Plates Opportunity	2003	Entrepreneurship
It was the middle of 1994. By then, 23-year-old Barry Berman had been trading in Cape Town number plates with short and unusual numbers for three or four months. The business was growing fast. But so was the canned fruit business that he had started with a friend at the beginning of the year. He no longer had the time to devote to both, and Berman wondered what to do. Should he ‘can’ the canned fruit and pursue the number plate business? This is the first in a three-part series that follows the fortunes of Berman and his company. The other two in the series are Letlapa Plates: Empowerment on a (Registration) Plate, and Letlapa Plates: At a Crossroads.		
BidorBuy: Bidding for First Place	2009	Entrepreneurship, Strategy
In November 2009, bidorbuy was the largest South African online marketplace. Following a failed attempt earlier in the year to purchase bidorbuy, kalahari.net – a subsidiary of Naspers and a highly successful online retailer – indicated that it was going to compete directly with bidorbuy as an online marketplace. Andy Higgins, managing director of bidorbuy, was a firm believer that, if his company could reach a certain level of wide-scale popularity, it would virtually be impossible for a newcomer to compete. Higgins therefore had to find ways for bidorbuy to do this before kalahari.net entered the market.		
Birdi Golf Apparel: Flying High or Swinging Low?	2009	Entrepreneurship, Marketing, Strategy
In December 2008, Charlene Lewison, marketing director of the Johannesburg-based family business, Birdi Golf Apparel, surveyed the company’s well-stocked shelves with pride – but also with a growing sense of unease. In the past 12 years, Birdi had become an established brand on both the professional and amateur golf circuits in South Africa. In recent months, however, sales had started to slow as the economic crisis took effect, and Lewison knew the time had come to rethink her company’s marketing strategy and planning. Should the company look at new products, or perhaps new market segments? Should it retain its ‘niche’ status or broaden its base, or should it try to penetrate its current corporate business further?		
Black Like Me: Creating a Legacy (A, B, C, D, E) - Creating a Legacy	2003	Entrepreneurship
The first part of this case is set in 1985, when twenty-five year old Herman Mashaba and two colleagues decided to enter the ethnic hair-care market in a politically turbulent South Africa with an evocative name for their product and a R30 000 loan. The case consists of four parts, each presenting a phase in the progression of Black Like Me from a “back-yard” operation in a black township, to an organisation ready to enter the global ethnic hair-care arena in 2002. The case presents the background of the entrepreneur, Mashaba, and his dream of independence, the choices he faced as the new South Africa emerged and global competitors entered the market, the consequences of his decisions and the recovery of Black Like Me. The final part of this case is set in 2007, when after Mashaba has made a decision to exit executive involvement in the company and pursue black economic empowerment objectives.		
Calum McCracken and NGN Telecoms: The Power of Perseverance	2014	Entrepreneurship, International Business, Strategy
In September 2014, Calum McCracken, chief executive officer (CEO) of Next Generation Network Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd (NGN Telecoms), met with his partners to discuss the company’s Kenyan dilemma. Doing business in Kenya had proved to be far more challenging than in any other country. Among other challenges, the company had to deal with fraud and negotiate from scratch with a new telecommunications operator, without success. This ended in a struggle to renew its Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) licence. No licence meant no trading and the company eventually had to withdraw from the country. Years had passed since the company’s first entry into Kenya, but McCracken felt the time was right for another attempt. What should the partners consider to avoid the challenges of the past?		
Dan Olofson: IT Magnet at a Turning Point	2008	Entrepreneurship, Strategy

<p>“We cannot just sit by and do nothing!” said Sebastian Olofsson to his uncle, Dan Olofsson, a Swedish IT billionaire and owner of a private game reserve in Hluhluwe (northern KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa). It was February 2003, they were both at the reserve and Sebastian had just returned from a guided tour of the vicinity that had exposed him to the dire poverty in the area and the human suffering there caused by HIV/AIDS.</p> <p>Olofsson concurred. He had been thinking the same thing for some time. He had bought the land for the lodge in 2002, initially as a private retreat for his family and friends. He was now thinking of developing it as a commercial venture. He had been deeply affected by the need in the area, but what was it that he could do to make a difference?</p>		
<p>Desmond Makondo (A) An Innovative Idea</p>	2009	Entrepreneurship
<p>In August 2002, Desmond Makondo walked out of the Johannesburg offices of digital products manufacturer, Hewlett Packard (HP), with a digital camera, two printers and an undertaking that he would pay the company R8 000 for the equipment within two months. He had no idea how he was going to do this, but he knew there was no going back; he had no choice. He had to find a way to make this equipment make money. But how?</p>		
<p>Desmond Makondo (B) Partnership the Way Forward?</p>	2009	Entrepreneurship
<p>It was December 2004, and Desmond Makondo had turned his photographic business, Digitally on the Move CC, into a profitable concern in the three years since he had walked away from Hewlett-Packard’s (HP) offices with a camera, two printers and no idea what to do with them. He had acquired a number of regular corporate clients and was photographing various events including golf days, corporate functions, conferences, graduations and more. Now he had the opportunity to bring a partner on board to help him develop and grow the business, but he wasn’t sure if this was the best plan of action at this stage.</p>		
<p>Desmond Makondo (C) At a Crossroads Again</p>	2009	Entrepreneurship
<p>By June 2009, Desmond Makondo was again at a crossroads with regard to his business. At the end of 2007, the two-year partnership with Edward Jardim had ended amicably when the two realised that the business couldn’t sustain a part-time partner who wasn’t able to work the necessary hours. Since then, Makondo had continued to run the business single-handed, being responsible for photography with the help of his six freelancers as well as administration, bringing in new clients and strategic planning. However, the immense growth of the business meant that doing all of this had become very stressful. Makondo knew that the situation could not continue. He would have to put structures in place to ensure the smooth running of his company, and to ensure that he did not burn out from exhaustion.</p>		
<p>Discovery Ltd: Entrepreneurship at its DNA</p>	2010	Entrepreneurship, Strategy
<p>On 1 September 2009, as financial services firm, Discovery Ltd was about to release its annual results for 2008/2009, its chief executive officer (CEO) and founder Adrian Gore, took some time to consider the company’s trajectory since its inception 16 years ago. Discovery was now in the top 40 on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). This year’s results were excellent: in the context of the global economic crisis, operating profit had grown by 32%. Still, Gore was not one to remain satisfied with these achievements. He had worked hard to instil an ethos of entrepreneurship and innovation in the organisation. Now he wondered whether he had done enough to sustain that into the future and what the next opportunity would be.</p>		
<p>Gouritz Cluster Biosphere Reserve: Towards Sustainability</p>	2017	Entrepreneurship, Sustainability
<p>From her office on her farm in the Eden District of South Africa’s Western Cape province, Wendy Crane, who had for many years been involved in the conservation efforts of the Gouritz Cluster Biosphere Reserve (GCBR), drank in the view of the Langeberg Mountains. Her pleasure was a bit diminished by the knowledge that, like so many parts of the GCBR, this area’s environment was under threat.</p> <p>She was preparing for a meeting in March 2017 of the board of the non-profit company (NPC) that sought to initiate and coordinate activities that would achieve the goals of the GCBR. The NPC board members wanted the organisation to be self-sustaining when it came to core costs. To this end, the board had established Gouritz Enterprises as a social enterprise that would be responsible for profit-driven activities which would fund the NPC’s core costs. The enterprise had not yet started work in any formal way, and Crane was not sure if establishing a separate profit-driven entity was the best way of achieving the self-financing goal.</p>		
<p>Gouritz Cluster Biosphere Reserve: Towards Sustainability Teaching Note</p>	2017	Entrepreneurship, Social Entrepreneurship
<p>The Gouritz Cluster Biosphere Reserve (GCBR), an international biosphere reserve programme, is an initiative of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). UNESCO describes these reserves as “learning sites for sustainable development”, saying: “Biosphere reserves harmonize conservation of biological and cultural diversity, and economic and social development, through partnerships between people and nature. They also contribute to the transition to green societies by experimenting with green development options such as sustainable tourism and training for eco-jobs.”</p>		

<p>This case situates Wendy Crane, who has for many years been involved in the conservation efforts of the GCBR, savouring the view of the Langeberg Mountains from her office on her farm in the Eden District of South Africa's Western Cape province. Her pleasure is diminished by the knowledge that, like so many parts of the GCBR, the environment of this area is under threat. She is preparing for a meeting in March 2017 of the board of the non-profit company (NPC) that seeks to initiate and coordinate activities to achieve the goals of the GCBR.</p> <p>The NPC board members want the organisation to be self-sustaining when it comes to core costs. To this end, the board has established Gouritz Enterprises. This social enterprise will be responsible for profit-driven activities that will fund the NPC's core costs. The enterprise has not yet started work in any formal way, and Crane is not sure if establishing a separate profit-driven entity is the best way of achieving the self-financing goal.</p>		
Habitaz: Growth Beyond Success	2006	Entrepreneurship
<p>Walking around a potential new building space of over 2000m² in July 2006, Hein Koen and André Sharpe, joint founders of Habitaz, a provider of integrated virtual workspace infrastructure and related services, noted that they had achieved great success since the start of the business two years ago. They were, however, faced with the urgent challenge of making the right strategic decisions regarding the future growth and financing of the business. As they pondered their options, the directors hoped that they would end up making choices that could catapult the company to even greater levels of achievement.</p>		
Leading Fruit and Veg City into Fresh Pastures	2005	Entrepreneurship, Strategy, Leadership
<p>It was September of 2005. Brian and Mike Coppin had founded Fruit and Veg City 11 years ago and knew that over the past 11 years they had done an excellent job of translating the mission of the organisation into action. They had sustained success and growth by delivering quality fresh produce at the right price to their identified markets, and they had done so by ensuring continuous innovation and exceptional service. However, they could see that there had been a change in the industry. Market needs had evolved and there were a variety of opportunities under consideration.</p> <p>In order to achieve their vision of 200 profitable stores by 2010, the Coppins were keen to experiment with a number of segmentation and store concepts and wondered whether these would be as successful as their existing business model had been. In order to build the brand globally, which concept would work best? But, in particular, could they be sure that their recipe for success would continue to be the right one, and would their methods of leading managers, workers and franchisees keep working as well as they had in the past?</p>		
Legendary Retail Brands: A Sustainable Business Model?	2016	Entrepreneurship, Strategy
<p>With many years of experience as an entrepreneur and businessman, Alan Reeves, chief operating officer (COO) of Legendary Retail Brands (LRB), which was the shareholder and administrator of the Mica, DIY Depot and House of Paint and Décor voluntary buying group (VBG) brands, was continuously thinking about the next step for the group. Member profitability was good, despite a tough economic environment, but Reeves was aware that this could change easily. "That's why we need to plan ahead for the next five years," he thought. As he planned for the next board meeting in September 2016, Reeves considered the options for the group and what he could recommend regarding the way forward.</p>		
Letlapa Plates: At a Crossroads	2004	Entrepreneurship
<p>It was 12 January 2004 and Barry Berman's year had just got off to an awful start. Berman was MD of Letlapa Plates, which, in 2000, had won a three-year contract from the Gauteng Department of Transport and Public Works (Gauteng DOT) to market personalised registration numbers (PRNs) in the province. Berman had returned from a relaxing holiday at the coast to find a letter from the Gauteng DOT waiting on his desk. His contract had expired in November the previous year, said the letter, and the Gauteng DOT was not going to extend his contract. Berman stared at the letter, his heart sinking. Would he have to cut his losses now and shut up shop, or could he do anything to ensure that he still had a business?</p>		
Letlapa Plates: Empowerment on a (Registration) Plate	2003	Entrepreneurship, Strategy
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Nando's Chilli Sourcing: Innovation for Social Impact	2015	Entrepreneurship

In late 2013, Nando's, a global chicken restaurant chain, marked the successful implementation of a project for ethical sourcing of African bird's eye chillies (ABE) – the signature ingredient of the brand. The initiative had set Nando's on the road to securing its annual requirement of ABE from traceable sources, while improving the lives of participating small-scale farmers in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. However, Jed Goldstein, programme manager of the initiative, wondered whether Nando's could sustain ethical sourcing of ABE in a context where procurement of other goods and services continued unchanged.		
Nando's Chilli Sourcing: Innovation for Social Impact Teaching Note	2016	Entrepreneurship
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Ndaba Ntsele: Entrepreneurial Vision	2010	Entrepreneurship
On 19 May 2010, Ndaba Ntsele – Ernst & Young World Best Entrepreneur (SA, 2007) and CEO of Pamodzi Investment Holdings (PIH), a diversified investment company – was preparing for the launch of Pamodzi Aviation the next day. The company had secured a licence from the Ukraine-based, government-owned Antonov Aeronautical Scientific Complex to service and sell Antonov planes in Africa. However, he still had to negotiate the terms of the relationship that Pamodzi Aviation would have with Denel Aviation, the organisation providing the necessary technical expertise and infrastructure for the venture. His gut told him that Pamodzi Aviation could make millions – if not billions – of rands, but he was aware that real-world realities might get in the way and he wondered if he had missed anything.		
Polecat: Poised for Growth	2008	Entrepreneurship
It was October 2007, and a perfect early summer's day in Cape Town. In his small loft office, Michael Meltzer, founder of Zacron Industries CC trading as Polecat, which manufactured and marketed a patented clasp and claw device used in shopfitting as well as many other applications, was deep in thought. His business, which had shown impressive growth since 2005, was poised to take a further quantum leap forward. The question he asked himself was whether he had the capacity to cope with such extensive expansion? He had started out with a very ambitious business plan, but wondered whether he should be reassessing it in the light of how the business had developed thus far.		
PTiP: A Bumpy Road to Solar Success	2017	Entrepreneurship, Innovation, Commercialisation of Innovation
Not for the first time since opening his company's demonstration facility in the Stellenbosch Technopark, Professor Vivian Alberts – chief executive and co-founder of Photovoltaic Technology Intellectual Property Innovations (PTiP) – stood back and admired what he saw. Twenty years had passed since this academic physicist began working on thin-film photovoltaic (PV) technology. He believed it had the potential to make a significant impact on South Africa's energy problems and to capture a share of the international market. Interested parties, including Eskom, had come to see the facility, but by September 2016, Alberts had yet to sign his first deal to license and build a turnkey solar module factory. He was unwavering in his belief that PTiP had something the country needed, but he was also aware that if it didn't take off fairly soon, the commercial window of opportunity would close. What was the solution?		
Raizcorp: Planting the Seeds for Entrepreneurial Growth and Prosperity	2012	Entrepreneurship
Raizcorp chief executive Allon Raiz was faced each day with many applications to join his business incubation Prosperator programme. He knew what to look for in an entrepreneur, but it was not always "cut and dried". In September 2012, he and his panel were considering an applicant who had passed all the tests with flying colours, and they were unanimous in their belief that he had what it took to be successful. His business, however, left them in doubt. It was a struggling IT support company, which they felt had no differentiating factors in an already overtraded industry. Raizcorp believed in "backing the jockey but not the horse", which often meant having to change the entrepreneur's mindset and helping them explore new ideas. Would they be successful in this case? And was it worth the investment of time and resources? It worried Raiz, because he knew if the individual was to embark on a new venture, it would take some time before Raizcorp would see any return on its investment.		
SA Home Loans: Bank Bashing is Good for Business	2004	Entrepreneurship, Finance & Accounts

Simon Stockley, SA Home Loans' CEO, was a lawyer by education but an entrepreneur by nature; his colourful, nonconformist socks epitomised his character. The first person in South Africa to build a business based around the concept of securitisation, he had taken just five years to break into South Africa's capital market and take on South Africa's major banking institutions. He had gained approximately 11% market share for new mortgage bonds (estimated to be worth R500 million per month), 3% of South Africa's estimated R258 billion total mortgage market, and forced the banking institutions to change their home loan finance <i>modus operandi</i> in response to his competition. Despite these achievements he was dreading the upcoming board meeting – he could predict the question that would be asked; the question for which he, as yet, had no sure answer. At the end of the board meeting Laurence Rapp, director of strategic investments and alliances, Standard Bank, would ask, "So Simon, what is your next BHAG?"		
Shanduka Black Umbrellas: Giving Impetus to Black Entreprises	2016	Entrepreneurship, Strategy, BBBEE
In September 2016, Seapei Mafoyane, chief executive officer (CEO) of Shanduka Black Umbrellas (SBU), a business incubator targeting emerging black-owned enterprises, was busy writing her annual review for inclusion in SBU's 2016 annual report. She believed that SBU had an essential role to play in ensuring the success of black entrepreneurs in South Africa, among whom the failure rate was notoriously high.		
SolarTurtle: Searching for the Game Changer	2018	Entrepreneurship
James van der Walt, founder of SolarTurtle, looked out of his office window at the people sitting in the common area of Stellenbosch University's LaunchLab. Van der Walt's mind was, however, far from the LaunchLab's collegial environment that afternoon in May 2018. SolarTurtle had not been growing fast enough to make the company self-sustaining, and the current finance model for franchisees had proven to be unsustainable. Van der Walt wondered whether the introduction of the BabyTurtle and the MiniTurtle, the company's newest products, would improve the growth rate of the company.		
Tasha's: Franchising the Boutique Café Experience	2009	Entrepreneurship
At the beginning of 2009, Natasha Sideris, owner and founder of Tashas – a hugely popular gourmet café in Atholl Square, Sandton – was on the verge of a massive expansion: to open 25 franchises at upmarket centres around the country. On any given day, the cheapest cars outside Tashas in Sandton were in the quarter of a million rand mark. Their owners had no problem queuing to have a meal or a coffee at the constantly-packed café. Inside, Sideris was calling the shots, telling her waiting staff off if they were not complying with her strict service rules. Her managers were pacing, making sure everything was as expected. The customers were just enjoying the food and ambience. Tashas was so successful because it offered a unique combination of delicious food and classy ambience. Sideris was excited, but there was that niggling doubt: could she maintain the magic of the hugely popular restaurant while franchising it?		
Taking Banking to the Unbanked: Wizzit (A,B,C)	2006	Entrepreneurship, Strategy
Part A of this case is set on a warm, Johannesburg summer's day in January 2003, when Brian Richardson was deep in thought. He and his partner, Charles Rowlinson, were contemplating an entrepreneurial venture with the broad aim of taking banking to the unbanked and underbanked people in South Africa – who constituted 49% of the adult population – and doing so on a profitable basis. Parts B and C examine critical points in the development of the business, and decisions that had to be made at these points.		
Tia's Muesli: Small Dog in the Big Dog's Lair	2013	Entrepreneurship
In April 2011, Hani Niayesh, owner and managing director of breakfast cereal manufacturer, Tia's Muesli, received an unexpected phone call from the Pick n Pay Hypermarket Head Office. The retailer, which formed part of one of South Africa's biggest supermarket chains, invited Tia's to list with it again. In 2009, Niayesh had obtained a listing at a few Pick n Pay Hypermarkets in Johannesburg. Eighteen months later he delisted, disillusioned by his experience. Despite promises of support from the retailer, Niayesh was undecided whether to venture back into what he recalled to be a minefield. Would it make business sense for Tia's Muesli to list with the retailer again?		
Young Designers Emporium: Growth and the Entrepreneur	2004	Entrepreneurship, Strategy

In the nine years since the inception of Young Designers Emporium (YDE), its founder, Paul Simon, had seen his vision of providing cutting-edge fashion and lifestyle products created by hopeful young South African designers, grow into a successful chain of ten stores in South Africa's premier shopping malls. Having started with a R10 000 loan from his father, and his mother's retirement policy as surety, Simon had trusted his instincts that the reward from his kubbitz-style operation would be greater than the risks. Now, at the end of 2003, Truworths, a leading fashion retailer with 257 stores in South Africa and 14 franchise operations in Africa and the Middle East, was offering to purchase 75% of his company, thereby providing the credit facilities that YDE needed to help it grow further. Simon needed to decide whether closing this deal was really the answer to unleashing YDE's true potential.		
FINANCE & ACCOUNTS		
Anheuser-Busch InBev and SABMiller: Would Strategic Benefits come easily with "Newco"?	2015	Finance
On 11 November 2015, Carlos Brito, chief executive of global leading beer brewer Anheuser-Busch InBev (AB InBev), presented his final offer of US\$105.5 billion (£69.8 or £44 pounds per share), to acquire its rival, SABMiller, which the company accepted. The acquisition process had started in September and just over a month later, on 13 October, SABMiller had accepted the offer in principle, but had certain requirements before it would accept. Such a massive transaction could well present hurdles – one being anti-competitive issues.		
AngloGold vs Newmont: The Bidding War for Normandy	2002	Finance & Accounts
Bobby Godsell, chief executive officer of AngloGold, South Africa's largest gold producer, had to decide whether to increase the company's bid for the control of Normandy, Australia's largest gold producer. AngloGold had made an offer for Normandy in early September 2001, and about two months later American mining giant, Newmont, had put in a competing bid for the Australian company. The case presents the choices facing AngloGold in its strategy to acquire Normandy and ward off the Newmont bid. It deals with the issues of national perceptions and loyalties, exchange rates, media and investor relations, and introduces the key role of arbitrageurs and hedge funds.		
Bank Saderat Iran: Financial Embezzlement under Sharia Law	2013	Finance & Accounts. Ethics, Governance
In September 2011, news of Bank Saderat Iran's involvement in an embezzlement operation became public. Amir Mansoor Khosravi, an Iranian businessman, had used fraudulent documents from Bank Saderat to obtain bank loans that amounted to US\$2.6 billion. At the time, the fraud was the biggest in the history of Iranian banking and those implicated faced harsh penalties, including death sentences. As Iran's public prosecutor investigated the case, senior officials at Bank Saderat denied having any knowledge of the fraudulent operation.		
Barclays Bank: Colluding to Manipulate LIBOR	2013	Finance & Accounts. Ethics, Governance
In late June 2012, the results of a long-term investigation by the United Kingdom's (UK) financial watchdog, Financial Services Authorities (FSA), revealed that derivatives traders and bankers at Barclays bank had been colluding to influence submissions that influenced the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the European Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR). The investigation also showed that Barclays' employees had colluded with colleagues at other major banks to influence their LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions, and consequently reduce the rate at which the two had been set. This had allowed the banks to make greater profits on trades, especially in the United States (US) derivatives market, which often relied on LIBOR as a reference rate for financial products. The scandal led to the resignation of the Barclays chief executive officer (CEO), Bob Diamond, and a number of the Barclay's senior executives, as well as the imposition of a hefty fine on the bank.		
Black Economic Empowerment Background Note	2004	Finance and Accounts, Environment of Business, Strategy
The objective of this note is to define black economic empowerment (BEE) and understand its context in South Africa. The reasons for black economic empowerment and the enabling legislation are discussed. The note also addresses the impact of black economic empowerment on South African businesses, as well as some of the challenges faced at the time this note was written.		
Blue Financial Services Group: The Perils of Rapid Expansion	2013	Finance & Accounts, Strategy

<p>It was June 2010 and Dave van Niekerk, the chief executive officer (CEO) of micro-lending company Blue Financial Services (BFS), had just handed in his resignation. BFS, which listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange AltX in 2006, had in less than four years expanded its operations to 15 African countries from an original five and employed more than 3 000 people. During this time, however, the company had faced escalating problems that had resulted in a write-off of more than R1 billion and a share price – which had reached a high of 700 cents – dropping to 15 cents. A rescue deal by turnaround expert Johan Meiring of private equity firm Mayibuye Group (Pty) Ltd was on the cards, and had forced van Niekerk’s resignation. Van Niekerk asked himself what had gone wrong and could the company, under new management, be saved?</p>		
<p>Charterhouse Bank: Banking Operations Undermining the Law</p>	2013	Finance & Accounts. Ethics, Governance
<p>On 23 June 2006, the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) announced that it had placed Charterhouse Bank (Charterhouse) under statutory management as a result of an ongoing investigation into banking operations at Charterhouse. The CBK led the investigation into Charterhouse over allegations of money laundering and tax evasion, which involved a sum of US\$1.75 billion. By October 2012, the Charterhouse controversy had still not been resolved.</p>		
<p>Deutsche Bank AG: Spying on Stakeholders</p>	2013	Finance & Accounts. Ethics, Governance
<p>In May 2009, news of Deutsche Bank’s spying operations became public. Over a period of six years, the bank’s corporate security department had conducted secret surveillance of certain employees, board members and shareholders. Deutsche Bank had hoped to use the knowledge gained to its advantage in court or in the media. Thus, the bank faced the possibility of legal action instituted by the people it had spied on. Furthermore, news of the spying operations had the potential to damage Deutsche Bank’s reputation as a trustworthy institution.</p>		
<p>Dimension Data in Africa: Making BEE Work</p>	2014	Finance and Accounts, Black Economic Empowerment
<p>In September 2012, IT firm Dimension Data paid out R1.26 billion to the various participants in a broad-based black economic empowerment (BBBEE) deal that the company had signed eight years earlier. When Dimension Data had first embarked on its empowerment journey, legislated BEE in South Africa had been in its fledgling stages and, to a large extent, companies such as Dimension Data had to write their own rules. On the eve of the payout, Jeremy Ord, Dimension Data’s executive chairman, reflected on the outcomes of the deal, including the successful growth of the company’s Middle East and Africa (MEA) division. He wondered, too, what he would do differently, if he had to do it all over again.</p>		
<p>Ellerines and African Bank (Part A) Suitable Suitors?</p>	2015	Finance, Mergers & Acquisitions
<p>At the end of the third quarter of 2007, Leon Kirkinis, chief executive officer (CEO) of African Bank Investments Limited (ABIL), unexpectedly arrived at the head office of Ellerine Holdings Limited (EHL), a South African furniture retail group, with a proposal to purchase EHL. For some time, EHL, which derived a substantial portion of its profit from loans provided to customers wishing to buy furniture, had been looking to enter into a deal with a bank as a means of growing its business. Up until the ABIL offer, EHL had been seriously considering a joint venture with Capitec Bank. Now, EHL’s CEO, Peter Squires, and the EHL board had to decide which route to choose.</p>		
<p>Ellerines and African Bank (Part B) A Toxic Acquisition Recipe</p>	2015	Finance, Mergers & Acquisitions
<p>In August 2014, seven years after Ellerine Holdings Limited (EHL) had been purchased by African Bank Investments Limited (ABIL), the board of EHL announced that EHL and Ellerine Furnishers (Pty) Ltd (EF) had applied for voluntary business rescue. The new EHL chief executive officer, Mano Moodley, and his board wondered if their decision to partner with ABIL had been too hasty. If they had chosen an alternative partner, would the outcome have been different?</p>		
<p>IDC: Prioritising Development Impact</p>	2012	Finance & Accounts, Strategy
<p>As Geoffrey Qhena, chief executive officer (CEO) of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), sat in his office at the organisation’s headquarters in Johannesburg, reviewing details of the recently published annual report in preparation for a meeting with the board, he reflected on the state of the organisation he had led since 2005. Now it was October 2012 and, under his leadership, the performance of the organisation was generally lauded as impressive. Qhena wanted more, intending to grow the development impact of the IDC by increasing its minimum loans from R1 million to R5 million in 2013. He wondered how best to achieve this in the current environment of economic uncertainty.</p>		
<p>Lehman Brothers: The Fall from Grace</p>	2013	Finance & Accounts. Ethics, Governance

<p>On 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for bankruptcy protection at the United States Bankruptcy Court in Manhattan, New York. The news of Lehman's bankruptcy filing sent shockwaves through the United States (US) financial markets, the impact of which was later felt across the world, contributing to the global financial crisis in the same year. As a major American financial institution, Lehman held US\$639 billion in assets at the time of its demise, making its bankruptcy filing the largest in the history of the US. Once looked upon as "too big to fail" by financial analysts, a combination of misjudged calculations in subprime lending and commercial mortgage-related investments, coupled with the quest to increase profitability, resulted in the collapse of the bank.</p>		
<p>Managing Finances at Johannesburg Hospital</p>	2006	Finance & Accounts
<p>It was approaching the middle of the 2006/07 financial year. The Johannesburg Hospital finance director, Gumani Matodzi, had just completed another weekly run of the hospital's top 20 goods and services expenses. As always, National Health Laboratory Services (NHLS) expenses were at the top of the list and yet again they were over budget. The demands of the Public Finance Management Act (no 1 of 1999) (PFMA) made it important to ensure that the hospital did its best to stay within its budget, and Matodzi wondered how he could better manage NHLS expenditure.</p>		
<p>Massmart: Growing the Growth Engine</p>	2000	Finance & Accounts, Strategy
<p>Massmart acquired Game in September 1998. Unlike its own mass retailer, Dion, which had experienced difficulties since 1993, Game had enjoyed great historical success. The merger of the two businesses was an obvious decision, but Massmart was haunted by the fact that its attempt to merge Dion and Makro five years previously had proven to be a disaster. This case examines the complexities of mergers and acquisitions by comparing and contrasting Massmart's Dion/Makro merger with the Dion/Game merger.</p>		
<p>Metermatic Limited: MBO or no MBO?</p>	2004	Finance & Accounts, Strategy
<p>Piet Malan, CEO of Metermatic, had to come to some decision about whether to attempt a management buy-out (MBO) of Metermatic from its parent, SAFREN. Malan's management team, particularly the sales manager, were very keen to take management control of Metermatic, but Malan was more cautious. He was worried about the risk of the high levels of debt that Metermatic would have to sustain and the fact that Equis, the private equity company, wanted him and the management team to put up some of the equity. Yet this was a rare opportunity that might not present itself again.</p>		
<p>Nomura Group: Trading with Privileged Information</p>	2013	Finance & Accounts. Ethics, Governance
<p>In late March 2012, the Securities Exchange and Surveillance Commission (SESC), the investigative unit of the Japanese Financial Services Authority (FSA), confirmed that Nomura Securities Co., Ltd (NSC) – a subsidiary of Nomura Holdings, Inc. – had been involved in insider trading. On at least three occasions, before official announcements for share issues were made, employees at NSC leaked confidential information on securities offerings that the firm underwrote, with the aim of stimulating market demand for the shares. While trying to repair its tarnished reputation, the company faced hefty fines from the Japanese financial regulators.</p>		
<p>Old Mutual: Demutualisation and Listing</p>	2001	Finance & Accounts, Strategy, Marketing, International Business
<p>Old Mutual was established in 1845 in the Cape of Good Hope as a mutual society. By 1999, Old Mutual provided a broad range of financial services to its policy-holders and other clients: life insurance, asset management, banking, and general insurance, with total assets of 32 billion pounds (R311 billion). On 12 June 1999, Old Mutual listed on the London and Johannesburg Stock Exchanges. Although the global economic situation had recovered from the Asian crisis, Old Mutual's management were perturbed. South African companies had recently emerged after decades of isolation, and were relatively unfamiliar with the complexities of international markets. Johannes van der Horst, Executive General Manager, responsible for demutualisation and listing, was concerned that the vagaries of the global markets could turn against them.</p>		
<p>Pamodzi Investment Holdings: To List or Not to List?</p>	2009	Finance & Accounts, Strategy, Entrepreneurship
<p>In January 2008, the black-owned Pamodzi Investment Holdings (PIH) was at a crossroads, as its chief executive officer (CEO), Ndaba Ntsele, sat down with his board to discuss how to finance the growth of the business. Ntsele and co-director, Solly Sithole, had founded PIH's predecessor, Pamodzi Property Developers, and grown it from nothing in 1979 to a multi-million rand concern, using only debt finance and working capital. PIH, founded in 1997 to take advantage of the opportunities presented by black economic empowerment (BEE) deals, had followed the same funding strategy. But Ntsele wanted to grow PIH into an organisation comparable in size and stature to Anglo American or Bidvest, and he was not sure that PIH could achieve these aims using the same strategy as in the past. The board was, therefore, considering whether or not to list the company and, if not, how they could raise the funding necessary to achieve the strategic goals of the business.</p>		
<p>Peregrine Financial Group: Misappropriating Customer Funds</p>	2013	Finance & Accounts. Ethics, Governance

In early July 2012, the United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) filed a federal lawsuit against Peregrine Financial Group Inc. (PFG), a futures trading firm, and its founder Russell Wasendorf. The CFTC accused PFG and Wasendorf of fraud, violating customer funds amounting to US\$215 million and submitting false financial reports to the National Futures Association (NFA), which operated under the CFTC's supervision. PFG faced liquidation and Wasendorf, if found guilty, faced a fine or a jail sentence.		
Remgro: Distributing its Tobacco Interests	2010	Finance & Accounts, Strategy
<p>It was December 2009, just over a year since Remgro Limited (Remgro) had completed the distribution of its indirect shareholding in British American Tobacco plc (BAT): 90% of its shares had gone to its shareholders, while the balance of 10% went to a new investment vehicle listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange, called Reinet Investments. The shares received by Remgro in Reinet Investments were also distributed to its shareholders. Thys Visser, chief executive officer of Remgro, sat in his Stellenbosch office and reflected upon the transaction, which had resulted in the largest dividend distribution in the corporate history of South Africa. The process had taken approximately two years from start to finish, and Visser concluded that the transaction had been implemented and completed successfully. "Our shareholders got direct access to the asset [BAT shares] and we didn't sell out – and we found a sustainable solution," he explained.</p> <p>Remgro's market capitalisation had dropped by more than half in the process, with the market value of its interest in BAT comprising 52% of Remgro's last reported net asset value. Visser thought about whether this would require a change in investment strategy for the company. He was not concerned about the reduction in Remgro's size, recalling that they had shrunk the business when its international assets were split off into Compagnie Financiere Richemont AG (Richemont) in 1988, and once again when technology-driven investments were placed into VenFin Limited in 2000. Remgro had continued to grow on each occasion, despite the restructuring, and he pointed out that it was what you did with your remaining assets that counted.</p>		
Salient Features of a Management Buyout (MBO) - Background Note	2004	Finance & Accounts
A management buyout ("MBO") involves the purchase of an existing business by its senior management team. It has proved itself to be an attractive vehicle for management, who can accumulate wealth in the form of an equity participation in their company. This note looks at salient features of MBOs, such as how they are structured and financed, and how equity is allocated. It also examines how to evaluate an MBO candidate to gauge whether it has potential for success.		
Standard Chartered Bank plc: Violating Banking Sanctions for Profit	2013	Finance & Accounts, Ethics, Governance
On 6 August 2012, Benjamin Lawsky, superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS), announced findings from an investigation of Standard Chartered Bank New York (SCBNY). The DFS claimed that over nine years, SCBNY had hidden 60 000 transactions totalling US\$250 billion for Iranian banks on which the United States (US) government had imposed sanctions. The announcement resulted in a loss of £4.81 per share from Standard Chartered Bank's (SCB) stock, erasing £11.5 billion from the bank's market value. SCBNY accounted for 15% of SCB's revenue, and faced the possibility of having its banking licence revoked by the DFS.		
The Phone Shop: Growth and the Entrepreneur (Part A)	2009	Finance & Accounts, Entrepreneurship
In August 2006, the lease on The Phone Shop – a business that the Brill family had run for the past 18 years – was up for renewal. In recent years, the shop had not performed well, but Eran Brill believed that because it had developed a strong brand over the years, there was potential to make it profitable once again. Still, a lot of people felt it was best simply to close the shop down. Brill wondered whether he should listen to this advice or to his own instincts, and if the latter, what he could do to turn the shop around.		
The Phone Shop: Growth and the Entrepreneur (Part B)	2009	Finance & Accounts, Entrepreneurship
In August 2009, Eran Brill, director of The Phone Shop (Pty) Ltd, a consumer electronic goods retailer, was about to renegotiate the lease on his Sandton City store. This event marked three years since he had taken over the store, at a time when it was struggling to make sales and to meet its debt obligations. Since then, he had managed to put The Phone Shop onto a much sounder financial footing, and he had opened two more stores. Looking ahead, he wondered whether he could improve on what he had achieved, in the next three years, particularly now that the recession had started to take hold.		
The South African Minimum Wage Conundrum: Equality vs Growth?	2017	Finance, Economics, Economic Policy
On 8 February 2017, parties to the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) signed an agreement on the introduction of a national minimum wage (NMW). The only party that refused to sign the agreement initially was the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), but it subsequently signed on 2 March 2017.		
UBS AG: The Cost of Failing to Manage Operational Risk	2013	Finance & Accounts, Ethics, Governance

On 15 September 2011, news of United Bank of Switzerland's (UBS) operational failures in its investment banking division hit the market. Kweku Adoboli, a trader who worked at UBS's central London branch, had beaten the control system and carried out a number of unauthorised trades. The trades cost UBS US\$ 2.3 billion in losses – the biggest trading-related loss in the history of banking in Britain, with the impact felt across banks in Europe. Engulfed by calls for closer scrutiny of its entire operational system and trading culture, senior management at UBS fought hard to restore confidence in the bank.		
HIV/AIDS		
HIV/AIDS in South Africa: What is an Adequate Response?	2001	HIV/AIDS
Peter Doyle, Group MD of Metropolitan, who developed the Metropolitan Model, noted that in Europe and North America the impact of HIV infection had been modest. In Africa, however, it was significant. The situation in South Africa was unique; the country had a modern economy, and was skills-dependent and technologically advanced. The larger social, political and economic impact associated with the South African epidemic, as well as those obstacles that prevented South Africa from formulating an adequate response, were examined. The appropriateness for South Africa of Brazil's response was explored.		
Identifying Best Practice: Metropolitan and HIV/AIDS	2001	HIV/AIDS
Núr Samuels was one of the founders of the Western Cape AIDS Business Forum. A growing requirement was manifesting within South African companies to implement programmes that were effective in the management of HIV/AIDS management. Samuels recognised the need for the documentation of 'best practice' with regard to managing HIV/AIDS in the workplace. Metropolitan was an early leader among those taking action against the epidemic in South Africa. Samuels considered which criteria to use in her decision to document and assess their initiatives to ascertain whether the company's HIV/AIDS activities would qualify as best practice. She considered which criteria she should use.		
Increasing VCT Update at Anglo American	2004	HIV/AIDS, Human Resources
In 2004, Dr Brian Brink, the man charged with managing mining group, Anglo American's (Anglo's) response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, conducted a review of Anglo's HIV/AIDS policies. In his assessment, the results were lacking: 35 000 Anglo employees were HIV positive. He believed that the root of the problem was that the number of employees voluntarily electing to be tested for HIV was disappointingly low. Without knowing their status, HIV-positive employees could not take advantage of Anglo's offer of free anti-retroviral drugs, and HIV-negative employees could not take steps to prevent infection. At the same time, without knowing employees' status, Brink could not take steps to help prevent future infection of HIV-negative employees, or ensure that HIV-positive employees had access to antiretroviral medications and critical information on how to prevent transmission of the virus to their spouse, child, or sexual partner. How could he increase employees' uptake of voluntary counselling and testing?		
The Human Face of HIV/AIDS	2002	HIV/AIDS
"We almost woke up a little bit too late," said Clifford Mkhize with a wry smile as he discussed his company's response to the HIV/AIDS crisis. It was April 2005, and the consequences of the HIV/AIDS pandemic were becoming increasingly obvious. The private sector was taking more responsibility for what had initially been regarded as a public health and social issue, as businesses became aware of the implications of its failure to take proactive steps to halt the epidemic. Mkhize considered his company's response so far.		
Treatment Action Campaign: Managing Activities	2008	HIV/AIDS
It was mid-2008 and Zackie Achmat, founder of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) – widely regarded as one of the most successful HIV/AIDS activist organisations in the world – sat in his office in the historic Westminster House in Adderley Street, Cape Town considering the future. The organisation was facing two related challenges that he was unclear how best to address. Firstly, it was in urgent need of improved professional day-to-day management and administrative skills if it was to sustain its successes of the past 10 years. But with activists as the backbone of the organisation, motivated by ideological rather than career ambitions and with little knowledge of corporate processes, it was proving difficult to create the more structured working environment that the TAC needed. Secondly, Achmat, now in his mid-forties, HIV positive and with a heart attack behind him, was aware that he may have a shorter lifespan than most, and wanted to move on to do other things. He was unconcerned about the future political or ideological leadership of the TAC. The question was how to find a national manager or chief operating officer with consummate business skills, the knowledge to understand the complexities of the TAC's organisation and work, and the ability to manage activists.		

Trucking Wellness: An Industry's Response to Managing HIV/AIDS	2012	HIV/AIDS, Human Resources
<p>In 2012, South Africa was still one of the countries with the highest prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the world. Statistics SA estimated that in 2011, 10.6% of the total population and 16.6% of the adult population (people between 15 and 49 years of age) were HIV positive.</p> <p>According to Suzanne Leclerc-Madlala, Leickness Simbayi and Allanise Cloete, all researchers at the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), certain cultural factors contributed to the spread of sexual diseases in South Africa. They noted that African groups were traditionally polygynous and made allowances for men to have extramarital relationships and to seek other wives after their first marriage. "While many men today marry monogamously in accordance with Christian rites, many continue polygynous relationships in an informal way through extramarital concurrent partnering," they observed, adding: "Whilst traditional polygyny has declined in many African societies, men in present-day South Africa commonly engage in multiple and concurrent partnerships." They pointed out that sex with multiple and concurrent partners had been identified as a key behavioural cause of HIV in southern and South Africa.</p>		
War on HIV/AIDS	2001	HIV/AIDS
<p>South Africa had the most rapidly growing HIV/AIDS epidemic in the world. By 2001, 4.2 million South Africans were infected with HIV. However, the development of a comprehensive HIV/AIDS policy and subsequent action by the government was noticeably absent. A critical role had emerged for business to provide AIDS education, prevention and health care to employees, particularly considering that they would have to bear many of the costs associated with an infected workforce. Clem Sunter, Chairman of the Anglo American Chairman's Fund, and a well-respected public figure, considered ways how to convince businesses to implement workplace programmes.</p>		
HUMAN RESOURCES		
Bruce Clarke at Rand Merchant Bank	2002	Human Resources
<p>In August 2002, Matthew Thompson, head of the structured finance division at Rand Merchant Bank (RMB) faced an unusual dilemma. One of the top performers in his unit, Bruce Clarke, appeared to pose a significant threat to the team spirit of his division. While a remarkably talented individual, Clarke was difficult to get along with and eccentric in his ways. RMB's dictum was "traditional values, innovative ideas". Clarke subscribed to the "innovative ideas" part, but seemed to fall short when it came to "traditional values" – to a point where his behaviour was unacceptable.</p> <p>Before making a rash decision, Thompson felt compelled to consider other factors such as irrational jealousies and rivalries that may be masking an otherwise benign situation. Dismissing Clarke could have severe consequences for his division's earnings, yet would the Structured Finance division be able to continue successfully with him as part of the team?</p>		
Foschini Group Ltd: Transforming HR	2010	Human Resources, Strategy, Organisational Design & Development
<p>Foschini Group's (FOS) Shani Naidoo was in excellent spirits when she walked out of a two-day group strategy meeting in October 2009. As managing director for group human resources (HR) since 2005, it was evident that the changes that she and her team had implemented had successfully made HR a critical part of Foschini's overall business strategy. In pursuit of their vision to get rid of the company's silo mentality, the HR team had introduced a totally new, centralised HR model. Despite the shake-up, Naidoo believed there was still a great deal more that needed to change. She did wonder, however, if she might have gone too far.</p>		
In Line with the Business: A Human Resources Model for Nedcor Bank	2001	Human Resources, Strategy
<p>Nedcor Bank management considered the strategic re-positioning of the HR function at Nedcor, along the lines of a proposed new HR model for the bank. The plan was to retain a central HR function for decentralised commercial units to have a high degree of autonomy with regard to HR management. The extent to which the HR function should be autonomous in the separate business units, and the exact role that would be played by the central HR function, had to be determined to ensure that the HR function created value and delivered tangible results. Faced by an increasingly hostile banking environment, management could not afford to make a mistake.</p>		
Kalafong Hospital: Where Have all the Nurses Gone?	2006	Human Resources

By May 2006, Dr Trevor Fisher, the chief executive officer (CEO) of Kalafong Hospital (situated to the west of Pretoria and one of South Africa's largest regional hospitals) was at his wits' end over the staff shortages at the hospital. There were shortages in all staff categories, but that of nursing staff in particular was making it very difficult to provide an acceptable level of health care. Fisher's numerous letters and attempts to resolve the issue with the Gauteng Department of Health had not yet met with success. Now, reading a damning report by the official opposition in Parliament, the Democratic Alliance (DA), on the state of nursing in South Africa, he wondered if there was anything he could do to improve the situation at Kalafong.		
Managing Organisational Conflict at Tikkun Consulting (Pty)	2006	Human Resources
In early 2006, Tikkun Consulting (Pty), a niche, public-sector focussed, legal consultancy was plunged into heated conflict when the firm's co-director, Thandeka Mathabane (who owned 60% of the company and generated much of its business), accepted a government brief to identify legal alternatives to marriage as a way of recognising gay and lesbian unions. Several members of the firm were unhappy that Mathabane had accepted the brief, with one threatening to resign, while Mathabane refused to give up the contract, declaring that her professional work should not be subjected to personal judgments. With a lean staff of 12 professionals, the firm's founder, Joshua Goldstein could not afford to lose either his co-director or his employees. He was under tremendous pressure to resolve the organizational conflict, which threatened the very existence of the company.		
Massbuild: Culture "Gets it Done"	2015	Human Resources, Organisational Design & Development
In February 2015, Llewellyn Walters, CEO of Massbuild, the building products division of Massmart, a warehouse retail organisation, was perplexed by the results of the 2014 employee engagement survey. The survey showed that employee engagement had continued to decline for a third year. Walters reflected on his decision in 2009 to work on the adage "culture will eat strategy for breakfast" and initiate a culture change process as a means of ensuring that Massbuild achieved its strategic objectives. The decision to go the culture route had not only led to better results, but also facilitated decisions regarding the division's brands and resulted in renewed customer focus. He wondered what more the organisation could do to reinforce its culture.		
Massbuild: Culture "Gets it Done" Teaching Note	2015	Human Resources, Organisational Design & Development
Massbuild is the building products division of Massmart, a South African-based warehouse retail organisation that Walmart acquired in 2012. The details in this case span a period from 2009 (prior to the acquisition by Walmart) to 2015.		
MTN in Nigeria: Sailing too close to the wind?	2016	Human Resources, Leadership
In July 2016, MTN's newly appointed CEO, Rob Shuter, was considering how it was possible that the company had been fined US\$5.2 billion (R78 billion) by the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) in October 2015. He also wondered what could be done to prevent a debacle of this magnitude from reoccurring. It appeared that leaders were not paying attention to the issues and, most importantly, had neglected and had failed to adhere to vital regulations. The transgression was clear. MTN had failed to ensure that subscribers had registered their SIM cards in terms of the international Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act (RICA). The situation that resulted in the NCC imposing the fine should have been obvious to MTN's leadership – but was it?		
Nedcor Incentive Scheme	2002	Human Resources
Nedcor chairman, Chris Liebenberg, was facing an avalanche of press criticism over an incentive scheme that the organisation had introduced for top executives. In an increasingly global market, where South African salaries could not compare in Rand terms with those being offered internationally, and where domestic instability was causing people to look for greener pastures, Nedcor had to find a way of retaining its top executive if it was to remain competitive. For his part, Liebenberg was convinced that the principles behind the scheme were sound. Yet the continual criticism was proving to be very damaging to Nedcor's reputation and the group's share price had slipped as criticism of the scheme grew. Liebenberg had to decide on a course of action.		
Pipeco: Workers Boycott the Workplace Challenge	2003	Human Resources, Industrial Relations

<p>In October 1997, with the support of the Chemical Workers' Industrial Union (CWIU), which represented workers at Pipeco's plants, Thomas Bowler, MD of Pipeco, had taken the company into the Workplace Challenge Project – a productivity improvement initiative devised by the National Economic, Labour and Development Council (NEDLAC). But his attempt to introduce this workplace change project had not been successful, and a year later it had made no progress. One key incident that came to mind was the workers' boycott of the Workplace Challenge earlier in the year. As far as Bowler was aware, employee buy-in had been obtained. Instead, when the CWIU's local organiser arrived at the Roodekop plant on 26 May for a meeting of the newly-established bipartite working group, no shop stewards were present. The workers had mandated their shop steward representatives not to attend the meeting. Bowler felt that if he could understand why the workers had boycotted the Workplace Challenge, then he would better understand how to achieve co-operation between management and workers in South Africa.</p>		
<p>Pretoria Portland Cement: Engineering HR</p>	<p>2005</p>	<p>Human Resources, Strategy, Organisational Design & Development</p>
<p>“PPC today is a professionally run company with motivated and dedicated people. This is reflected in the total shareholders' returns achieved over the past few years and the increase in the market capitalisation of the company.” This was how John Gomersall, chief executive officer of Pretoria Portland Cement (PPC), concluded his review in PPC's Annual Report 2003.</p> <p>Rod Burn, organisational performance director of PPC, read these words with some satisfaction. The change was in part due to the Kambuku Process, an organisational transformation initiative that PPC had instigated in 2000. Its aim had been to mobilise the talent and energy of PPC's people so that they would work with PPC in achieving the demanding cash flow return on investment (CFROI) targets that it had set as part of a value-based management (VBM) strategy embarked on late in 1999.</p>		
<p>Pretoria Portland Cement: Engineering HR - Part A</p>	<p>2004</p>	<p>Human Resources, Strategy, Organisational Design & Development</p>
<p>In February 2000, the Kambuku team of Pretoria Portland Cement (PPC) got together in the Kambuku “war room” to plan the way forward for the project. Rod Burn, PPC's director of organisational performance, had appointed them to work on finding a way to get more out of PPC's people so that the company could reach the taxing cash flow targets that chief operating officer (COO) John Blackbeard had set. PPC's performance over the preceding five years had been dismal and the company was feeling the heat of competition from two major international competitors. Achieving the turnaround targets set by Blackbeard would not be possible without the buy-in of the people. Burn had asked the Kambuku team to design a system that would have this as the output. But what were the components of this system?</p>		
<p>Pretoria Portland Cement: Engineering HR - Part B</p>	<p>2004</p>	<p>Human Resources, Strategy, Organisational Design & Development</p>
<p>Rod Burn, organisational performance director of PPC, looked back over the past four years with some satisfaction. Since 2000, when PPC had instigated an organisational transformation initiative known as the Kambuku Process, shareholder returns had improved, as had market capitalisation. The management culture had changed completely and there was a new level of energy in the organisation, with people at all levels taking pride in their work. But Burn did not want to take it for granted that this success would continue. It had taken hard work to get the Kambuku process to this point. It would take more hard work to maintain and improve it. Thinking in terms of a simple SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis, what were the factors that he had to watch out for and what were those that he could build on to ensure that the process did not lose momentum?</p>		
<p>The Marginal Performer</p>	<p>2002</p>	<p>Human Resources</p>
<p>It was that time of year again: performance appraisal and salary review time. Nadia Strom, the new branch manager at the Pentlands branch of Barrows Bank, had one of her most difficult appraisals coming up the next day. The performance of branch accountant, Michael Nyageri, was not up to standard and was affecting the overall performance of the branch. She had to decide how to handle the appraisal and how to map a way forward with him towards improved performance.</p>		
<p>The Sebata Group: Doing Business the African Way</p>	<p>2014</p>	<p>Human Resources, Strategy, Organisational Design & Development</p>
<p>Matome Modipa, executive chairman and founder of the Sebata Group of technical engineering and management consultants, enjoyed coming to work. His offices in Midrand, near Johannesburg, had an open and friendly feel, and the pervading ethos reflected the African philosophies of <i>ubuntu</i> and <i>letsema</i> that he had worked hard to instil in the organisation. Sebata had enjoyed steady growth since its inception in 2006. Now, in October 2013, the company was on the cusp of further expansion, and Modipa wondered how he was going to keep these philosophies alive at Sebata.</p>		
<p>The South African Post Office: On the Brink</p>	<p>2017</p>	<p>Human Resources, Strategy</p>

<p>Mark Barnes, chief executive officer of the state-owned South African Post Office (SAPO), leaned back in his plane seat and started reviewing his notes. He and his team of executives were returning to Johannesburg after a meeting in Cape Town with members of the South African government's Portfolio Committee on Telecommunications and Postal Services. Barnes had motivated for a R2.7 billion bail-out for the Post Office, but the government was reluctant to invest.</p>		
<p>When he accepted the position of CEO, SAPO had been on the brink of collapse. By May 2016, Barnes had been in the job for less than a year and had already averted a proposed strike by SAPO employees. Barnes had hoped to turn SAPO around and that the organisation would achieve financial self-sufficiency and be able to raise its own capital within five years. However, he and his team were already three months behind in their plan to change the Post Office's fortunes. Barnes wondered if he needed to revise his strategy.</p>		
<p>Vodacom Customer Care</p>	2003	Human Resources
<p>Vodacom Customer Care provided an extensive training programme for new call centre employees. It had also made an effort to ensure that the work environment at its various call centres was pleasant with modern amenities. Performance of call centre agents was measured against a detailed bonus calculator system. In October 2002 the number of calls handled by each call centre agent was added to the list of criteria against which performance of call centre agents was measured. This had prompted a change in the relative weighting of each of the factors that contributed to the final bonus calculation. Ibeth Toerien, executive director: customer care at Vodacom, and Lori Kasselmann, Vodacom's executive head: capacity building and development reflected on whether it had been worthwhile adding quantity of calls handled to the bonus calculator. They debated whether it achieved the desired balance between quantitative and qualitative measures.</p>		
<p>Women in Wine: Can Principles Turn a Profit?</p>	2017	Human Resources, BEE, Organisational Design & Development
<p>In October 2016, the management team of Women in Wine – South Africa's first wine brand to be owned and controlled by black women – gathered to prepare for the annual meeting of company shareholders. Operating conditions locally and abroad over the preceding year had once again proved extremely challenging, and chief executive officer (CEO) Beverly Farmer felt the firm needed decisive action to improve its fortunes. Accordingly, she was going to present two possible courses of action to shareholders: focus resources on developing a more innovative marketing strategy for the company, or acquire a property to enable diversification into hospitality and farming ventures. Farmer wondered which option would be most effective in enabling Women in Wine to fulfil its central purpose: giving black women – particularly farm workers – a meaningful stake in a sector that had traditionally been controlled by white men.</p>		
<p>INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGEMENT MANAGEMENT</p>		
<p>20twenty: Alternative Banking</p>	2004	Information & Knowledge Management, Strategy
<p>When Saambou Bank collapsed on 9 February 2002, 20twenty, its newly formed online banking arm, had only been in operation for six months. During the six months it had been in operation, however, 20twenty had managed to capture the hearts of 40 000 customers with its innovative approach and fanatical service ethic: so much so, that most of its customers did not leave when Saambou collapsed, but stayed faithful to 20twenty until a rescuer came along 18 months later. The rescuer was UK bank, Standard Chartered, which wanted to open up an operation in South Africa and liked 20twenty's business model. Standard Chartered wanted 20twenty again to differentiate itself from its competitors by providing innovative banking services and fanatical dedication to its customers. However, this strategy might have worked two years previously, but would it still hold in 2004 when 20twenty relaunched? And if so, would it be sustainable in the long run?</p>		
<p>A Computer-Aided Disaster at London Ambulance Services</p>	2004	Information & Knowledge Management
<p>This case looks at the well-known failure of the computer-aided despatch system that the London Ambulance Service implemented in 1992. As the date for publication of the results of the enquiry into the incident approaches, John Wilby, former chief executive of London Ambulance Service wonders what went so desperately wrong at LAS. Was it just the IT industry that generated so many problems and cost so many millions, or was the LAS failure the result of gross mismanagement? Or perhaps it was both? The furore surrounding the failure of the Computer-Aided Despatch (CAD) system that had been implemented at LAS the month before seemed to indicate that there was more to it than simply placing the blame wherever it fell.</p>		
<p>eNatis: What Went Wrong?</p>	2008	Information & Knowledge Management, Project Management

<p>On 31 May 2007, Werner Koekemoer, project manager for the eNaTIS (a new national traffic information system) in the Department of Transport (DoT), and Johan Vorster, project director of Tasima (the consortium that had developed the system), met to reflect on the highly publicised failure of the new traffic information system on 12 April, just over a month before. Jeff Osborne, chief executive of the Retail Motor Industry Organisation, had been particularly scathing. “Matters are in a state of chaos,” he had said. “The failure to register new and pre-owned vehicles has affected everybody’s cash flow. We have lost a billion rands and thousands of deals. The system is worse than the old one.” It had been a very stressful time.</p> <p>In view of the excellent transaction statistics for the month of May, they were inclined to believe that the system had experienced only “normal technical teething problems” during April. Yet, could it be that other factors contributed to the national crisis, they wondered? The lessons would be important for the roll-out of future similar government projects, and nothing could be taken for granted.</p>		
ERP at IST (Part A): Making the Choice	2002	Information & Knowledge Management, Project Management
<p>In July 2000 the enterprise resource planning (ERP) steering committee of the specialised engineering and information technology group, IST, had a choice between two value-added resellers and their software options: IFS with its own Oracle-based system, or Resolution Software with the Great Plains system. Neither IFS nor Great Plains/Resolution showed the perfect fit and the steering committee had heard many horror stories about ERP implementation at other firms. It did not want the same to happen at IST. This is the first in a series of three cases that looks at the ERP implementation process at IST.</p>		
ERP at IST (Part B): From the Frying Pan	2002	Information & Knowledge Management, Project Management
<p>When the new chief executive of IST, Harry Coetzee, took up his position in March 2001, he couldn’t believe the shambles that was the ERP implementation programme at IST. The group had commissioned Resolution Software to implement the Great Plains system, but the process had gone badly awry and was in danger of being derailed completely. What had gone wrong? And what did he need to do to get the process back on track? This is the second in a series of three cases that looks at the ERP implementation process at IST.</p>		
ERP at IST (Part C) : Deadline Looming	2002	Information & Knowledge Management, Project Management
<p>It was the beginning of December 2001. The revised “go live” deadline of 1 March 2002 for IST’s ERP implementation programme was approaching fast and Nico Scholtz, IST’s ERP project manager was not sure that the system would be ready by that date. Moreover, there appeared still to be some strong internal resistance to the system. Scholtz had to recommend a course of action to IST CEO, Harry Coetzee. This is the third in a series of three cases that looks at the ERP implementation process at IST.</p>		
eThekwini MetroConnect: Broadband for the Community	2010	Information & Knowledge Management
<p>In the early 2000s, the eThekwini Municipality (the City) embarked on a strategy to turn Durban into a ‘Smart City’. As availability and quality of ICT infrastructure was the prerequisite for achieving this goal, the City started laying a next-generation fibre optic cable network throughout the municipal area. In October 2008, the City launched MetroConnect, an initiative aimed at selling the excess capacity on its network to Internet service providers (ISPs) at a wholesale price.</p> <p>In March 2010, Jacquie Subban, head of the geographic information and policy unit of the eThekwini Municipality, knew that the real challenge of rolling out municipal broadband to all the businesses and citizens of the area still lay ahead. She wondered whether she would be able to maintain the momentum of municipal broadband roll-out and, if she could, by when all the citizens of eThekwini would have access to affordable connectivity?</p>		
IT Governance Background Note	2004	Information & Knowledge Management
<p>With IT playing an ever more fundamental role in daily business activity, there is a growing acknowledgement that IT influences organisational success. Businesses rely on IT for competitive advantage, but often board and management expectations of IT are not aligned with reality. A deluge of virus attacks and the ominous threat of personal liability for failure to take reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable IT risk have businesses in a panic over improving IT governance. However, between a lack of understanding about the business impacts of IT, a mass of e-commerce laws and governance frameworks, and the expectation on the CIO to improve ROI, increase service levels, and enhance security while maintaining flat budgets and headcount, boards and management need to demystify IT Governance, and understand how to apply the relevant principles in their business.</p>		
IT Outsourcing at Old Mutual	2002	Information & Knowledge Management

<p>It was almost three years since the South African subsidiary of the London-listed financial services organisation, Old Mutual (OMSA), had signed an information technology infrastructure outsource contract with CSC. Thus far, the contract had worked out well for both companies and the relationship between them was good, but the two groups were about to enter a new phase in the agreement. OMSA was CSC's first outsourcing contract in South Africa. The focus during the first three years had been on establishing the relationship between the two companies and bedding down systems and procedures. CSC had consciously not looked for new business, so that its attention would not be divided. Now the organisation wanted to expand and take on other clients.</p> <p>As Doreen Buultjens, head of group technology services at OMSA, considered these developments, she was concerned that until now, CSC had delivered the required service levels only because OMSA had been its exclusive focus in South Africa. Would she have to change the way in which the contract was managed, or could it continue as it was?</p>		
<p>Knowledge Management at Sasol: Learning Each Lesson Only Once</p>	2006	Information & Knowledge Management
<p>André Botha, acting knowledge management (KM) officer for Sasol Limited, faced considerable challenges. In 1998, Sasol had embarked on a KM journey, championed by KM officer Marina Hiscock. In 2000, the group had adopted a global KM strategy to extend KM to all strategic business units (SBUs) throughout the group. While some SBUs had implemented KM successfully, in others implementation had progressed slowly.</p> <p>In April 2006, Hiscock had resigned and the task of taking KM forward in the Sasol Group fell on Botha, an engineer who had successfully introduced KM at Sasol Mining. Now, in July 2006, it was time for Botha to take stock of what KM had achieved and consider what Sasol should do next.</p>		
<p>Knowledge Management: Designing a Strategy for BSW</p>	1999	Information & Knowledge Management, Strategy
<p>In 1984, three former Wits MBA graduates established BSW (Pty) Ltd. By the late 1980s, the founders of BSW recognised that knowledge management was the basis of their company's vision and philosophy. In April 1999, BSW's chief information officer, Pauline Smith, was charged with the task of recommending a knowledge management strategy to guide the company. Smith had to decide whether the company should adopt one of the models used by the consulting firms whose core asset was knowledge, such as Andersen Consulting and Ernst & Young, or to develop a customised strategy to meet the specific needs of BSW.</p>		
<p>NamITech: In the IS Security War Zone</p>	2004	Information & Knowledge Management
<p>William Wilsnagh, business unit director of technology services at NamITech, reflected on a rather alarming incident that had just occurred one of NamITech's clients. A virus had hit the client's network, resulting in downtime of a full day. NamITech had won this client a year previously, in November 2002 and the client's IS security had improved greatly. But, for Wilsnagh, the virus incident highlighted the need to extend the scope of NamITech's services. Information systems security was all about ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. Although viruses were the high-profile enemies in the IS security war, he knew that there was more to it than virus detection, prevention and elimination. He just needed to apply his mind to identifying potential risks and ways of addressing them.</p>		
<p>INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS</p>		
<p>Barclays Bank in Africa: Moving on from Colonial Roots</p>	2005	International Business
<p>A cathartic moment had been reached for the Africa operation of Barclays PLC when Barclays Africa CEO, Dominic Bruynseels presented two options to his team in January 2003. The bank's performance on the continent had been declining since 1986. It could either sell off the Africa operation within the next 12 months, or, if his team could demonstrate an ability to manage risk on the continent and deliver returns for the group in the following year, it could make a major acquisition in Africa. From that point on the turnaround gained momentum, and in May 2005 Barclays bought a controlling share in Absa Bank South Africa, the country's largest retail bank. Now, in June 2005, Bruynseels wondered how the bank would be able to sustain its recent good performance on the continent.</p>		
<p>Dimension Data: Globalising at Warp Speed</p>	2001	International Business, Strategy, Marketing, Entrepreneurship

<p>Dimension Data, founded in 1983, was listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 1987. By 2000, the company had grown into a provider of global network integration services and global end-to-end i-Commerce to corporations, telecommunication service providers and new economy companies. It was represented on five continents, in over 30 countries and employed more than 10 000 staff. Market value increased from R30 million in 1987 to R53.2 billion by March 2000. The group was not only the largest IT company in South Africa, but one of the largest integration service businesses in the world. On 19 July 2000 Dimension Data listed on the London Stock Exchange. Jeremy Ord, CEO of Dimension Data, contemplated whether listing was the correct decision. His future challenge, to maintain Dimension Data's position, in a fast changing market, and how Dimension Data could be continually re-invented globally on a continuous basis, concerned him.</p>		
<p>Engen and Petronas: Strengthening the Relationship?</p>	1999	International Business, Strategy
<p>Rob Angel, CEO of Engen, was concerned about the future of his company. By early 1998, the fall-out of the Asian crisis had affected world markets, including the JSE. A low stock price and global industry conglomeration increased the possibility of a hostile take-over, and the end of much of what Angel had accomplished. In June 1998, Petronas formally offered to buy out all the shareholders of Engen Petroleum Ltd. Angel needed to have a clear recommendation ready for the Engen board meeting planned to discuss the Petronas offer. The Petronas offer reflected a good strategic fit, but the price was low, and there was some concern about the operational integration of the two companies. If he were to recommend rejection of the Petronas offer, what other options should he pursue?</p>		
<p>Game: Competing in Africa's Playing Fields</p>	2010	International Business, Economics, Strategy
<p>In 2007, Jan Potgieter, chief executive of Massdiscounters, a division of Massmart, had steered Game, one of its general merchandise discounters, into investing far more vigorously in Africa. By June 2010, Game had shown significant growth in both turnover and profit, but Potgieter wanted the company's operations in Africa to become even stronger, in anticipation of the entrance of an international player. Potgieter, therefore, had to find ways to protect Game against new players entering the African market.</p>		
<p>MCM Wines in China: Taking on the Dragon</p>	2009	International Business, Entrepreneurship, Marketing, Strategy
<p>In July 2009, businessman and entrepreneur, Martyn Mills of MCM Wines, reconsidered his marketing strategy. He had been exporting his own wine to China since 2003 and had recently signed an agreement with the prestigious South African wine estate, Groot Constantia, to export its wine to that country as well. However, conducting business in China was complex and expensive and, earlier that year, he had partnered with a new importer in China to help combat certain of the challenges. Mills wanted to support his new business partner as much as he could in promoting MCM wines; however, he had a limited budget. Given this fact, how could he grow his market in China, he wondered?</p>		
<p>Nando's International: Taking Chicken to the World</p>	1999	International Business, Marketing, Strategy, Entrepreneurship
<p>Rob Brozin, chairman of Nando's International, based in South Africa, was reconsidering the company's international expansion programme in general, and the decision to enter Singapore and Malaysia in particular. The aims of listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in April 1997 were to insulate their South African operations from the risks of international expansion, and to raise the necessary capital for expansion. The main uncertainty for Brozin was the extent to which Nando's success in South Africa was transferable abroad.</p>		
<p>PruHealth plc: A Healthy Expansion for Discovery?</p>	2006	International Business
<p>It was June 2006 and Shaun Matisonn, CEO of PruHealth plc – a 50/50 joint venture formed in late 2004 between Discovery Holdings in South Africa and Prudential plc in the United Kingdom (UK) – was about to relocate his office from Johannesburg to London. As he contemplated his move, Matisonn wondered how he was going to make the joint venture work. While PruHealth was showing early signs of success, Matisonn knew that joint ventures were notoriously difficult to manage, especially across two different continents. He had the backing of two very substantial shareholders, but with that came the challenge of two sets of equally substantial expectations. Matisonn thought about what had to be done to ensure that the business remained on track.</p>		
<p>South African Breweries and the Miller Acquisition: A Risk Worth Taking</p>	2003	International Business, Strategy
<p>Against a background of intense merger and acquisition activity in the brewing industry, Chief Executive of South African Breweries (SAB) Graham Mackay, faced a difficult decision in early 2002. By this time talks about the possible acquisition of the USA's second largest beer producer, Miller Brewing, by SAB, were well advanced. The proposed deal would reshape the top tier of the global brewing industry, catapulting the fourth and seventh largest brewers in the world to the number two position.</p>		

While Mackay was happy with SAB's progress in emerging markets to date he wondered whether this was the right moment to move into the developed world. Moreover, he wondered whether the Miller business was the right way to go. Mackay and his management team had spent many hours analysing all aspects of the business and had isolated certain problem areas within it. While they believed that SAB had the resources and capabilities within the group to meet the operational challenges these problem areas presented, the question remained: was the Miller deal a risk worth taking?		
South Africa's War over Scrap Aluminium	2004	International Business
It was 15 February 2004 and Gerhard Nicolaus, director: metals and allied industries in the South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), was preparing for a potentially acrimonious meeting of stakeholders in the scrap metal industry. Since 2001, local purchasers of recycled aluminium had expressed concern that the prices of recycled aluminium in SA were inflated, and that scrap was being exported at the expense of local demand. As a result, in May 2003, the minister of trade and industry had signed a new policy that prohibited the granting of export permits for specific classes of scrap and forced the scrap merchants to supply the domestic industry first. This meant that the scrap merchants faced a possible cutback in profitability, because the export market was very lucrative. The scrap merchants had protested vociferously and implementation of the policy was delayed. Nicolaus's main objective was to maximise beneficiation in SA and he believed that the new policy should be regulated by the industry itself. But how could a win-win scenario be brought about for all the parties?		
MARKETING		
A Tale of Three Houses	2016	Marketing, Marketing Strategy
The first thing Thandie Dhlomo, sales partner at the Rawson Property Group, did when she arrived home on a chilly Friday evening in July 2016 was pour herself a glass of red wine, kick off her shoes and curl up on her couch. She felt exhausted. Her last clients for the day had been Lunga Dlamini and his wife, Sonia. They were looking to move out of their rented house in Soweto and purchase their first home in one of the suburbs of Johannesburg. Dhlomo had helped them to narrow it down to three properties in three different suburbs: Linden, Parkhurst and Fourways. Dhlomo had just shown the couple the Linden property for the second time. Personally, she favoured the Parkhurst property as she felt that it was perfect for the family, but it was also the most expensive property of the three and she suspected that the Dlaminis had not been convinced. Dhlomo wondered what strategy she could use to persuade the Dlaminis that the Parkhurst property was the right fit for them.		
Absa's Free Internet Access	2002	Marketing
In 2001, about 2 million people had access to the Internet in South Africa, and Absa, one of the major banking groups in South Africa had an Internet banking client base of 153 000. In a move aimed at doubling this client base and changing the bank's image from one of e-laggard to e leader, the group decided, in conjunction with UK IT company, Affinity, to offer free Internet access to anyone in South Africa. Despite widely expressed scepticism about the viability of the project, the uptake was enormous. The projected month-one target of 10 000 registrations was reached on the first day. In 2002, however, Absa was forced to withdraw the offer of free Internet access for all, because Affinity had withdrawn from the deal, which meant that Absa would now have to incur the costs of the project, and an Absa subsidiary had been liquidated, which put some financial strain on the group. Santie Botha, Absa's group marketing director, reflected on the good, the bad and the ugly of the project.		
Beauty Factory: Planning a Future in a Slow Economy	2015	Marketing
Le-Sel Research, a family-owned, South African manufacturer of beauty products, launched Beauty Factory in 2011, after seeing a gap for affordable, high-quality beauty products. As a boutique retailer of beauty and home products, the brand had achieved early success, but growth and profitability had faltered as the economy had weakened. The marketing team believed that the brand had great potential. However, the challenge was to ensure that it reached its potential amidst the changing market conditions. Andrew Frodsham, the owner and CEO of Le-Sel Research, was considering a radical shift in strategy – from selling only through its branded Beauty Factory outlets to selling through some or all of the big retail chains in South Africa. In early 2014, he met with his team to map out the future of Beauty Factory.		
City Lodge Hotel Group: Redefining Segments and Brands	2015	Marketing, Marketing strategy, Branding

In 1985, the market regarded Hans Enderle as foolhardy when he resigned from the helm of one of South Africa's leading hotel chains to launch a new concept in short-stay accommodation. However, by 1990, his City Lodge select service hotel concept boasted seven hotels, with 1 000 rooms. By 2015, the hotel group's portfolio had risen to 55 hotels and annual turnover had reached more than R1 billion. However, growing competition and increasing customisation within the hotel industry meant that in early November 2015, current group chief executive (CE), Clifford Ross, had concerns about the clarity of the group's brand and whether it was losing its competitive edge.		
City Lodge Hotel Group: Redefining Segments and Brands Teaching Note	2017	Marketing, Marketing strategy, Branding
This case is set in 2015, when the City Lodge Hotel Group's portfolio had risen to 55 hotels and an annual turnover of more than R1 billion. However, growing competition and increasing customisation within the hotel industry meant that in early November 2015, current group chief executive (CE), Clifford Ross, had concerns about the clarity of the group's brand and whether it was losing its competitive edge. The case positions Ross deciding on how to clearly differentiate the different hotel offerings within the group.		
Coca Cola MDCs: Distribution Effectiveness vs Social Responsibility?	2011	Marketing, Strategy
By June 2010, The Coca-Cola Company's (Coca-Cola) micro distribution centre (MDC) network in Africa had proven to be incredibly successful. Coca-Cola had built up the network to distribute its products through small, independent local entrepreneurs to even smaller outlets, enabling the company to reach markets that traditionally had been very difficult to access. Now social marketers were approaching Coca-Cola for permission to distribute their own products using the MDC network. Paul Fourie, group strategy and business planning director of Coca-Cola Eurasia and Africa, soon had to present his recommendations to Coca-Cola and its bottlers – and wondered what he should suggest as the way forward.		
Creategy™: The Red Hot Strategy for ChilliBush?	2004	Marketing, Entrepreneurship
Dale Hefer, managing director of ChilliBush Marketing and Communications had started ChilliBush five years previously, operating from her Johannesburg garage. The business had proven remarkably successful, with billings exceeding R1 million after her first year of operation and reaching more than R18 million by 2003. However, Hefer knew that ChilliBush had to attract the big brands if they were to reach the billings target they had set of R36 million per annum by 2006. In order to do this, she and her co-directors had decided to differentiate the agency by developing a process that would formalise their approach to integrating strategic thinking with the creative process, whilst including a remuneration process that was based on risk. They had taken it a step further by actually registering a holding vehicle for this process, calling it 'Creategy™'. The question was whether Creategy™ would, in fact, give ChilliBush a competitive advantage.		
Flowers4U.co.za: Satisfaction Infraction	2017	Marketing, Customer Service
On 17 February 2017, Thomas Quinn, the managing director of online florist, Flowers4U.co.za, received an irate email from one of his clients. The client was still not satisfied with a solution he had proposed the day before to make up for unmet expectations regarding flowers delivered on Valentines' Day. Quinn wondered how best to respond.		
The Fairway Hotel: Customer Lifetime Value through a Loyalty Programme?	2015	Marketing, Marketing Strategy
In July 2015, Stefanie Pietzsch, guest relations and marketing manager of The Fairway Hotel, Spa & Golf Resort, a Johannesburg-based luxury city resort owned by property developer Guvon Investments, considered introducing a loyalty programme to reward her loyal guests. In recent years, hotels in Johannesburg had experienced the effects of slow economic conditions with an overall drop in room occupancy, which had resulted in increased competition. Pietzsch preferred a loyalty programme to be implemented at hotel rather than group level, but how prepared were both the Guvon Group and The Fairway for such a programme, and would a loyalty programme be an appropriate customer acquisition and retention strategy for the hotel?		
Hansa Pilsener: From Niche to Mainstream Brand	2002	Marketing, Strategy

<p>South African Breweries (SAB) launched its first light beer in South Africa, Hansa Pilsener, at the end of 1975. While sales of Hansa were initially brisk, the brand's subsequent performance was disappointing, and despite repeated changes of emphasis in the market positioning of the brand, Hansa struggled to find its appropriate target market. In the mid 1980s the situation changed, however, and sales started to increase. By the end of 1990, Hansa Pilsener had gained a sizable market share, and subsequently grew to become the second largest brand within the SAB portfolio. The challenge facing the Hansa brand team in the year 2001, was to come up with a creatively relevant campaign for the brand. In the past Hansa Pilsener had been positioned as a different choice, and as a niche brand for particular tastes and particular target markets. But as the brand had grown, so it had become increasingly difficult to maintain that position. How should the team reposition Hansa Pilsener and move it forward?</p>		
<p>Hansa Pilsener: Remaining Relevant in a Changing Market</p>	2012	Marketing
<p>In September 2012, Khensani Nobanda took over as general manager of Hansa Pilsener, South African Breweries' (SAB) second-biggest brand. Under her predecessor, Mosidi Seretlo, SAB had developed a highly successful advertising campaign for Hansa, featuring a character named Vuyo who epitomised the positioning of the brand. Conditions in the beer market had changed since the campaign was first launched, however, and Nobanda was now considering options for the way forward. Should she move Hansa's communications campaign away from Vuyo, she wondered? Or change advertising agency for some new ideas? Or rethink the brand's positioning strategy and consider a line extension into the premium beer market? Were there other options? She did not want to repeat some of Hansa's past failures, but rather to build on its success as she plotted a way forward.</p>		
<p>Harley Davidson® Motor Company: Bonding with the Biker</p>	2007	Marketing, Strategy
<p>Since 1996, when international motorcycle manufacturer Harley-Davidson (Harley) first established a presence in South Africa, the company had grown from only one dealership to seven independent dealerships in 2007. Expansion into the female market had been highly successful. However, the expansion of the black market remained a huge challenge to Harley in South Africa. Mishka Moller, marketing manager of four South African Harley dealerships, believed that the slight increase in the number of black Harley owners over the past two years did not nearly reflect the potential that was inherent among the so-called 'Black Diamonds'. What would Harley South Africa have to do to market the Harley lifestyle to this potential customer base, she wondered.</p>		
<p>Kalahari.com: Going Places with the Marketplace</p>	2012	Marketing, Strategy
<p>In February 2010, online retail company kalahari.com, launched the Marketplace, a trading platform aimed at allowing third parties to use the kalahari.com site to sell their goods. By May 2012, the success of the venture was exceeding expectations. Still, Bill Paladino, chief executive officer of the MIH Group, the South African multimedia company that owned kalahari.com, knew that the competitive nature of the online retail industry meant that there was no room for complacency. He wondered how to ensure the continued success of the Marketplace.</p>		
<p>Kulula.com: Now Anyone can Fly</p>	2003	Marketing, Strategy
<p>kulula.com was South Africa's first true low-frills airline and had managed to be profitable from day one. Its somewhat unconventional, but very funky communication strategy contributed hugely towards its successful performance. Advertising agency, morrisjones&co firmly believed that although its advertising campaign was risky, it might have been more risky if people did not notice it at all. They maintained that "if it was bold and in your face, it would stand out". And bold it certainly was with its bright green corporate colour and humorous outdoor banners which attracted more than they had bargained for. But would the marketing strategy still be appropriate as kulula.com became more established and the macro and competitive environment changed?</p>		
<p>Lew Auto: Getting the wheels turning</p>	2017	Marketing, Marketing Strategy
<p>As he made another payment to the previous owner of LEW Auto and Electrical & Aircon Repairs in June 2017, Peter Simelane, the new owner, was worried that his business was not growing as he had anticipated that it would. He had seen great potential for the business when he bought it in 2015, but by 2017 the business was still not living up to his expectations. He wanted to identify where the problem lay and what he needed to do to grow the business.</p>		
<p>Mowana Spa: A top-toe experience</p>	2015	Marketing, Marketing Strategy
<p>Since the opening of Mowana Spa at the Indaba Hotel in Fourways, north of Johannesburg, three years ago, marketing manager Sharon Hunink had sought to create an experience that would entice her customers to return again and again. The spa industry was becoming increasingly competitive and now, in September 2015, Hunink was reviewing all that she and her team had done to create an experience that would set Mowana apart from the many other day spas in the suburb of Fourways. She wondered what the spa was getting right and what else it could do to grow its customer base.</p>		
<p>Moyo's African Brand: A Brand Extension and Globalisation Strategy</p>	2005	Marketing, Strategy

It was mid-June 2005 and Jason Lurie, managing director of the Johannesburg-based Moyo restaurant chain, wanted “world domination” for the Moyo brand. Moyo restaurants – which contained a food, entertainment and retail shopping component – had achieved phenomenal success in the affluent suburbs of Johannesburg and Cape Town, and Lurie believed that the brand could be extended to a variety of products and services. As the first move towards achieving world domination, he was considering opening a 4 000 m ² retail store.		
MTN: One Group, One Vision, One Brand	2005	Marketing, International Business, Strategy
On 17 April 2005 African cellular telecommunications company MTN finally launched its new ‘everywhere you go’ pay-off line across all of its African operations. Three months later, with the rush over, MTN’s group executive director: marketing, Santie Botha, reflected on the company’s two-year journey towards adopting a global brand identity with locally relevant communication – the so-called ‘glocal’ approach. The journey had provided interesting learning about doing business in Africa, but she wondered whether the model MTN had developed would also be suitable for MTN’s recent business expansion into the Middle East.		
Nando's International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand	2004	Marketing
Josi McKenzie, marketing director of fast food chain, Nando’s International, considered the development of Nando’s International since its inception as a South African fast food organisation 16 years previously. By the end of 2003, there were a total of 450 stores throughout the world, 186 of them being in South Africa. McKenzie felt good about this record, but she felt that there was enough potential in the company to perform even better on a global basis in 2004. Nando’s ascribed this success, among others, to the fact that it had adopted a ‘hubbing’ growth strategy, as opposed to a ‘shotgun’ strategy. This meant that the company had concentrated on developing existing geographic regions, chiefly the Middle East and Asia, instead of taking any opportunity that presented itself. The critical issue up for debate for 2004 was ‘which hub should be developed next?’		
New Balance South Africa: Outrunning the Opposition	2006	Marketing, Strategy, Entrepreneurship
Since 2000, manufacturer of high-performance sports footwear and apparel, New Balance SA, had grown its market share substantially. Now, in 2006, the general manager of New Balance South Africa, Gary van Rooyen, considered the company’s future direction. In line with worldwide trends, opposition companies, such as Nike, had started to move into retail by establishing their own chain of stores. However, since the success of New Balance could partly be attributed to the company’s commitment to customer satisfaction, a decision to move aggressively in such a direction would put the company in direct competition with its retail customers and would certainly damage its current relationships with sports retail stores.		
Old Mutual: Breaking into the Mass Market	2015	Marketing, Marketing Strategy
It was November 2014 and just three months since Old Mutual, a well-established, global financial services group, had launched the 2-in-One Savings product to target the South African retail mass market. Anele Mbuya, senior marketing actuary for Old Mutual’s Retail Mass Market, wondered whether the product’s marketing strategy needed to be revitalised for it to achieve the sales forecasts for the next operating period. However, a tight marketing budget, customer perceptions of Old Mutual as a life insurer rather than a savings company and a poor savings culture in South Africa were some of the challenges the organisation faced. Old Mutual had a good track record in developing and implementing marketing strategies aimed at multiple market segments. However, it had still not optimally serviced the retail mass market. Mbuya had to consider how to take advantage of the opportunities this segment presented, and how to address its challenges for the product to achieve its potential.		
Pick n Pay Extortion Crisis: Product Tamperer Confronts Consumer Friend (Part A & Part B)	2004	Marketing
Part A of the case is set on the morning of 13 May 2003, when Sean Summers, chief executive officer (CEO) of Pick ‘n Pay, one of South Africa’s largest supermarket chains, received a registered parcel containing three items of food and a letter. The letter said that these items had been poisoned and that, unless Pick ‘n Pay cooperated and paid over a sum of money, the author would put poisoned food items on Pick ‘n Pay shelves. Summers had been with the group for 32 years and this kind of thing had not happened to Pick ‘n Pay before. What should he do? Part B of the case is set seven weeks subsequent to the first threat, after it appeared that the extortionist had actually put contaminated food in one of Pick ‘n Pay’s stores. After receiving the first letter, Pick ‘n Pay had contacted the police for advice, but had kept the matter from the press, confident that the extortionist would not harm its customers. Now it appeared that his strategy had changed. What should Summers do now?		
Quadrem: E-Procurement for Industry	2003	Marketing, Strategy

By 2003, Quadrem, a global e-marketplace that facilitated electronic transactions between buyers and suppliers from the mining, metals and minerals industry, was in its third year of operation. While some of the regions such as North America, Australasia and South Africa managed to operate profitably on a regional level, Quadrem as a whole was not yet profitable mainly because of its high fixed centralised costs. The shareholders however, expected Quadrem to break even by the end of quarter two in 2004. The case study revolves around Quadrem Africa, based in South Africa, and its dilemma to increase its growth to help Quadrem break even globally.		
Redhill High School: Free to Build Excellence	2009	Marketing
It was a Monday morning in early May 2009 and Mike Russell, principal of the highly academic Redhill High School in the north of Johannesburg, had had a demanding start to his day. He had just finished an early morning meeting with a parent concerned about his son's performance in Afrikaans. Russell had allayed the parent's fears by arranging for the pupil to have extra lessons. He felt sure that would address the parent's concern – but Russell had some concerns of his own.		
Sally Williams Fine Foods: Getting to Market	2008	Marketing, Strategy
Dries Pretorius, national sales manager of Sally Williams Fine Foods, a small manufacturer of luxury nougat, was furious. It was May 2007, four years since Sally Williams had first appointed its distributor and the thermostat at the distributor's warehouse had failed. As a result, his product had spoiled and he had to recall almost all of it. This was not the first mistake the distributor had made and Pretorius knew he had to make a change. Should Sally Williams bring distribution back in-house or continue to outsource it, he wondered. And if the decision was to outsource, what should the company look for in a new distributor?		
Skoobs: A Bookshop Experience with a Difference	2012	Marketing
When Marisa Torrani took a brief moment to relax in one of the elegant armchairs in her book emporium, Scoobs Theatre of Books, she drank in the scene with satisfaction. It was 6pm on a Friday in June 2012, 18 months since Scoobs had opened in one of South Africa's premier entertainment and gaming complexes, Montecasino, north of Johannesburg. The store was filling up with customers, many of them straight from work and looking for a place to unwind and, as she watched, she couldn't help wondering what it was, exactly, that drew people to Scoobs. She had often thought about opening more stores, but would a Scoobs store survive beyond the alluring walls of Montecasino?		
Soweto Style: Small Business Growing Pains	2018	Marketing
Thabiso Olifants, founding partner of Soweto Style, a small business involved in event organising and apparel manufacturing, sat in his 1983 BMW 325i Coupe in the early hours of a Saturday morning in mid-September 2017, deep in thought. Olifants had just arrived home from a meeting with his partners, where they had finalised plans for the Soweto Style Annual Party. The meeting had also served as a celebration for the success of their 2017 Winter Get Together event. While the evening had been successful, Olifants' mind was on the discussions regarding the future of the apparel division of Soweto Style. In November 2015, Olifants and his partners had decided to push the pause button on the apparel sales side of their business, realising that the company had outgrown the business model that they had been using and that change was needed to avoid the risk of reputational damage. Since relaunching the apparel division of Soweto Style with a new business model in April 2017, the demand for their apparel had exceeded expectations. What he was pondering on that early morning was how he and his partners were going to grow the business while dealing with capacity and financial issues.		
Tasha's Franchising: will Service Stand in the Way of Success?	2009	Marketing
It was a Saturday morning in April 2009 at Tashas at Atholl Square: the first Tashas that Natasha Sideris had opened, and her flagship store. As always, the restaurant was incredibly hectic. Sideris walked over to a table where one of the guests was complaining, and sought to smooth ruffled feathers. "We waited half an hour for a table, and then the waiter got some of our drinks orders wrong! That's simply not acceptable!" Sideris apologised profusely, and gave drinks and dessert on the house to the party of four. This seemed to calm the customers down. But this complaint troubled Sideris, because it echoed similar incidents reported in the findings of recent customer service research at her restaurant. She knew she was doing something right – Tashas, a gourmet café franchise, had been a customer magnet since it opened in September 2005 – but she could not be complacent; particularly not now, as she was starting to expand the franchise. She wondered whether she had the right systems in place to ensure that her franchises offered the right level of service, and whether she was stretching herself and her recipe for restaurant success too thin.		
Team Barloworld: Building a Global Brand	2010	Marketing

<p>It was July 2008 and the Tour de France had just finished. Barloworld Ltd, an industrial brand management company, had sponsored one of the teams that took part – named Team Barloworld. It was a team that had proven extraordinarily successful in 2007, earning the Barloworld brand significant global brand awareness and publicity. However, one of the Team Barloworld cyclists in the 2008 Tour de France had tested positive for doping, potentially compromising two of the Barloworld brand values, namely honesty and integrity. Now Chris Fisher, head of corporate marketing at Barloworld, had to make an urgent decision about the future of the sponsorship.</p>		
<p>The Expansion of Choppies in Africa</p>	2016	Marketing, Marketing Strategy
<p>On a Saturday morning in early October 2015, Choppies chief executive officer (CEO), Ramachandran Ottapathu, made his weekly visit to a Choppies store. While watching the familiar scenes in the Choppies superstore in Gaborone, he considered the company’s strategy to extend its African footprint. Choppies was the leading supermarket chain in Botswana, targeting the lower- to middle-income sectors. The company had 134 stores in three countries: 75 in Botswana, 38 in South Africa and 21 in Zimbabwe. Its major strategic objective was to increase its overall number of stores to 200, and the number of African countries it operated in to six, by the end of 2016. Ottapathu wondered how Choppies could achieve this objective while still growing value for shareholders.</p>		
<p>The Expansion of Choppies in Africa - Teaching Note</p>	2018	Marketing, Marketing Strategy
<p>From humble beginnings in 1986 with a single store in Lobatse, Botswana, by 2015 Choppies was the leading supermarket chain in Botswana. It was listed on the Botswana and Johannesburg stock exchanges and it had 134 stores in three countries: 75 in Botswana, 38 in South Africa and 21 in Zimbabwe. Choppies was also planning expansions into three other sub-Saharan countries – Zambia, Tanzania and Kenya – by the end of 2016. The company’s aggressive expansion outside Botswana was partly the result of frustration caused by the Botswanan government’s restrictive policies.</p>		
<p>The Laudare School: The Quest for Excellence in the Inner-City</p>	2013	Marketing
<p>In early January 2013, Adrian Miller, principal of the Laudare School, situated close to the inner-city in the lower-income suburb of Belmont in Johannesburg, was reading through the results of a recent customer satisfaction survey. While the feedback from parents and pupils was generally positive, it also highlighted some areas that needed attention, particularly the challenges of running a private school in an inner-city environment. Furthermore, with scarce resources it was difficult to grow and develop the school into one that offered an excellent educational experience. Miller wondered how he could ensure that the school offered its pupils, teachers, and parents a service that was in line with his vision.</p>		
<p>The South African Lottery: A Battle for Hearts and Minds</p>	2003	Marketing
<p>The South African National lottery had been in the firing line of the media and the public since its inception. The continuous distrust and suspicion with regards to the operations of the two role players, Uthingo (the license holder) and the National lottery Board (NLB) were cause for concern. In an attempt to improve their negative public image, Uthingo and the NLB made efforts to be more open and transparent through the use of advertisements, advertorials, road shows and their web site. In addition they took pains to reply in detail to all the accusations since 2000. However, its image had not improved significantly. What else could be done to reverse this perception?</p>		
<p>The Washing Powder Wars: Ariel versus Omo</p>	2015	Marketing, Strategy
<p>On 12 November 2014, Omo, Unilever South Africa’s premium washing powder brand, was facing the biggest challenge yet to its 50-year dominance of the South African washing powder market. Proctor and Gamble (P&G) had launched Ariel in May of the previous year, and a recent survey had shown that the brand had already gained loyalty among 10% of South African consumers. As Themba Ndlovu, Unilever’s newly appointed marketing manager, prepared for an Omo marketing strategy meeting the next day, he wondered what the company could do to ensure that Omo not only defended its market share, but grew it in the face of stiff competition.</p>		
<p>Verity: In Tune with Viral Marketing</p>	2009	Marketing
<p>Looking across the bay from her home in Hout Bay, Cape Town singer Verity Price (known to her fans as Verity) reflected on how she had not allowed the exclusive South African music industry to prevent her from making and selling her first album. She was one of the world forerunners in using Internet viral marketing to sell her music, and she was the first singer to sell an album before it had been made. Now, in April 2009 – nine months after her album was launched – sales had slowed, and she wondered whether she could use viral marketing differently to increase sales?</p>		
<p>Volkswagen South Africa: VW UP! Marketing</p>	2016	Marketing, Marketing Strategy

At the beginning of August 2016, Bridget Harpur, marketing brand manager for Volkswagen Group South Africa (VWSA), and Mark Handley, national sales manager, were debating how to grow sales of the entry-level VW up! that VWSA had launched in February 2015. The entry-level passenger car category was relatively small and highly competitive. The VW up! was VWSA's first car ever to target this market category. The car had maintained an average 8.5% market share since its launch. Handley and Harpur believed it had potential to build this share, especially among young, urban drivers. The question was how to adjust the communication strategy to capture the attention of this market.		
Women in Wine Abridged	2018	Marketing, Entrepreneurship
In October 2016, the management team of Women in Wine – South Africa's first wine brand to be owned and controlled by black women – gathered to prepare for the annual meeting of company shareholders. Operating conditions locally and abroad over the preceding year had once again proved extremely challenging, and chief executive officer (CEO) Beverly Farmer felt the firm needed decisive action to improve its fortunes. Accordingly, she was going to present two possible courses of action to shareholders: focus resources on developing a more innovative marketing strategy for the company, or acquire a property to enable diversification into hospitality and farming ventures. Farmer wondered which option would be most effective in enabling Women in Wine to fulfil its central purpose: giving black women – particularly farm workers – a meaningful stake in a sector that had traditionally been controlled by white men.		
Woolworths SA: Something in the Yoghurt Mix	2009	Marketing
In May 2008, alerted by a primary dairy supplier that one of its raw material suppliers may be including gelatine in its products, Julian Novak, divisional director of food at Woolworths SA, tasked his team to investigate the issue. The allegations proved to be true. There was gelatine in Woolworths' entire yoghurt range. In 2003, the company had agreed to ensure that its yoghurts were free of gelatine (a product derived from meat sources), and had therefore advertised them as such. One of the foundations of the Woolworths brand was its reputation for being trustworthy. Novak knew that there would be an outcry if this crisis was not handled correctly. He wondered how to act to preserve the company's reputation, and what action the company should take against the supplier.		
Zebra vs Uber: Waking up the South African metered taxi industry	2016	Marketing, Strategy
In August 2016, Ana Bonanni, head of Zebra Cabs, a South African metered taxi service based in Gauteng, had just finished a radio interview with Cape Talk journalist, Barry Bateman. The interview had focused on the disruption caused by the entry of e-hailing ride service, Uber, into the fragmented South African metered taxi industry, and whether traditional metered taxi services could survive. Zebra Cabs had implemented massive technological and vehicle changes in order to compete. However, Bateman had planted a seed of doubt in Bonanni's mind. Would the Zebra Cabs business model eventually disappear in favour of Uber? How could she ensure that Zebra Cabs weathered the Uber storm?		
Zest: A Driving Force in Motors	2010	Marketing, Strategy, Entrepreneurship
Johannesburg-based Zest, well respected in the electric motor industry, was the only distributor of WEG motors throughout southern Africa. In 2001, its chief executive officer (CEO), James Blakemore, added variable speed drives (VSDs) to the product portfolio and, by 2009, Zest had become the fourth-biggest player in the local drives market. Now, in July 2009, Blakemore pondered his options. Should he focus on increasing market share and boosting sales? Or had the time come to diversify once more? Perhaps, he wondered, he could look at the portable generator set market. On the other hand, being strong in drives, he was tempted to expand into control systems, which would add significant value to his current product offering. He knew, though, that that would mean competing with customers, thereby jeopardising the relationships he had so carefully built up over the years.		
ORGANISATIONAL DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT		
Compass SA: Changing the Recipe	2003	Organisational Design & Development, Strategy

<p>In October 2002 contract food-services group, Compass SA, was some way down the track in a process that aimed to transform the company into a learning organisation. Compass management had embarked on the process in the belief that it was only as a learning organisation that the group would be able to survive in the current, changing business environment and achieve the benchmark turnover and profit figures required by its UK parent, Compass plc, figures that the South African subsidiary had never before achieved. Some progress had been made in the transformation process, but Compass CEO, André Du Chenne, knew that the changes now needed to be embedded in the organisation as a whole and that the change process itself needed to be synchronised. The question was: how should this best be done?</p>		
<p>Constantia Insurance: No Second Chances</p>	<p>2003</p>	<p>Organisational Design & Development, Strategy</p>
<p>Robert Shaw, CEO of Constantia Insurance Company Ltd, had a tough decision to make. Margaret Townsend, his senior administrative director, had just left his office, having confessed to breaking company policy. She had a long record of good service with the company. Now, however, she had informed him that she had been involved in a car accident on her way home the previous evening and, because “it was an emergency”, she had made use of her corporate credit card. Relatively few staff had corporate credit cards and the company policy was very clear on their usage: under no circumstances, nor in any position whatsoever, were company credit cards to be used for private use. Constantia Insurance was very strict in enforcing its policies. Shaw regarded this as critical to business success. What should he do?</p>		
<p>First National Bank: Developing a Culture of Innovation</p>	<p>2011</p>	<p>Organisational Design and Development, Innovation</p>
<p>It was mid-September 2010. All 50 finalists in the annual First National Bank (FNB) Innovators Campaign were about to present their ideas to the judges. For CEO Michael Jordaan, this was a highlight in his calendar – he always looked forward to being inspired by the flow of new ideas.</p> <p>FNB had become known in the industry as a leader in banking innovation. When Jordaan took over the reins in 2004, he took innovation to a new level through the Innovators Campaign. But now he was wondering how to sustain the energy the campaign had engendered in his staff. What more could he do to nurture the spirit of innovation that permeated the organisation?</p>		
<p>FNB Metro: Waking up to Change</p>	<p>2003</p>	<p>Organisational Design & Development, Strategy</p>
<p>It was June 2003 and just over a year-and-a-half since First National Bank (FNB) Metro (a division of FNB Retail) had completed the first stage of an organisational transformation initiative aimed at changing FNB Metro’s culture into one that was based on a shared vision and values, and appreciated diversity and embraced personal empowerment. The first part of the initiative had been a resounding success. There was greater racial harmony and a new unity at FNB Metro, as well as a common commitment to the company’s vision. The bank’s results had improved, as had its service levels. The second part of the initiative, which was intended to institutionalise the new culture, had met with patchy success. It hinged on establishing regular, values-based, non-hierarchical meetings throughout the bank, to which staff were encouraged to bring issues of importance to the branch for discussion. Peet van der Walt, the chief operating officer of FNB Metro, wondered what could be done to embed the new culture in the organisation.</p>		
<p>Grant Thornton Kessel Feinstein Pretoria: A Winning Culture?</p>	<p>2002</p>	<p>Organisational Design & Development, Strategy</p>
<p>Johan Bignaut, the managing partner of Grant Thornton Kessel Feinstein Pretoria had worked hard to turn the partnership around and create a culture that was conducive to success. His efforts appeared to have been successful. The partnership had been dogged by in-fighting, bickering and power struggles. Now it was characterised by unity and mutual respect. But an ethnographic organisational culture survey had shown up a fundamental difference between the perceptions of the audit and other staff about the firm’s culture. The audit staff seemed to be deeply unhappy with the way things worked, and this both surprised and concerned him deeply. Would he and the partners have to change their approach?</p>		
<p>Hollard: The Office Move</p>	<p>2009</p>	<p>Organisational Design & Development, Strategy, Human Resources</p>
<p>By April 2009, Hollard Insurance had been in Arcadia, its new building, for a little over three years. A key motive behind the move had been to draw all Hollard employees together, so as to sustain and reinforce a common culture and facilitate communication across business units. Now, Hollard’s CEO, Nic Kohler, had a few things to consider: had the new building had an impact on Hollard’s culture, and on balance; had this been positive; and should he now move the company’s call centres to a smaller town, where competition for talent would be less intense? This might improve employee retention and better enable the company to invest in its call centre employees. At the same time, it would lower the salary bill. But would it also alienate the call centre employees, who provided a critical interface with Hollard’s customers? If Hollard did decide to move them off-site, what should he do to minimise the potential negative effects of doing this?</p>		
<p>Kagiso Trust: Deciding its Future</p>	<p>2015</p>	<p>Organisaional Design & Development, Strategy, Leadership, Social Development</p>

<p>In November 2014, Kagiso Trust (KT) was at an important crossroads. Anti-apartheid struggle icons such as Dr Beyers Naudé and Archbishop Desmond Tutu had established the organisation with European Union (EU) funds in the 1980s to promote the struggle against apartheid. Since then, KT had become a professional social development agency, funded in part by dividends from Kagiso Tiso Holdings (KTH), a black economic empowerment investment house that KT had helped to establish. Now, KT was on the brink of tripling its investment income by virtue of dividends from a black economic empowerment (BEE) deal it had entered into with banking group FirstRand in 2004. KT's trustees had to consider how best to use these additional funds.</p>		
<p>Legal Aid Board: Balancing the Scales of Justice</p>	<p>2008</p>	<p>Organisational Design & Development, Strategy</p>
<p>In 1998/1999, the Legal Aid Board faced closure because of a contingent liability of more than R600 million for legal services delivered by private practitioners to the organisation's clients. Since then, through three phases of transformation, under two board chairmen and three chief executive officers, the Legal Aid Board has turned itself around. It has received unqualified audit reports from the office of the Auditor General since 2002 and it has extended its services to represent the accused in approximately 400 000 matters per year.</p> <p>Now, in 2008, the organisation is ready for its next challenges: improving employee morale, expanding access to justice for all and working with stakeholders to instil confidence in South Africa's legal system. The challenge for the board is to identify the right approach to taking the organisation into the next phase.</p>		
<p>Nedcor Treasuries Integration: Good Fortune or Good Process?</p>	<p>2004</p>	<p>Organisational Design & Development, Project Management</p>
<p>In July 2002 banking group, Nedcor had purchased another banking group, BOE and decided to use this purchase as an opportunity, not only to integrate BOE into Nedcor, but also two other banks that had operated within the group. In typical fashion, the treasuries had raced ahead of the rest of the group, but appeared to have achieved the impossible: a complex integration in record time, with no fall-out for the bank. The rest of the group's integration process was still under way and would probably only be finished at the end of 2004. Was there anything that the other divisions in the bank could learn from the integration experience at the treasury? How much of what the division had achieved had been good judgement and how much had simply been good luck?</p>		
<p>Nihilent and STRATE: From Knowledge Transfer to Transformation</p>	<p>2003</p>	<p>Organisational Design & Development</p>
<p>It was the beginning of March 2003 and STRATE, the organisation that settled all equity trades in South Africa electronically, was about to merge with the Universal Exchange Corporation (UNEXcor), an organisation that settled bond transactions electronically. Monica Singer, CEO of STRATE, and future CEO of the merged entity, wanted to implement a balanced scorecard driven knowledge management process in UNEXcor that STRATE had successfully embarked on a year ago. Yet the process had been demanding: one that had required time and trust from all in the firm. Singer knew that it might be more complicated to institute the system amongst UNEXcor employees and get the necessary buy-in. Should she take a big-bang approach and simply tell the UNEXcor employees that this was the way it was going to be? Or should she adopt a more phased approach, trying to earn their trust beforehand?</p>		
<p>Nihilent: Recommending Change at The Banking Association South Africa (Part A & Part B)</p>	<p>2010</p>	<p>Organisational Design & Development</p>
<p>It was September 2008 and Ravi Teja, associate vice president and head of enterprise transformation at the global consulting company, Nihilent, was waiting to meet with his team to review their progress on The Banking Association South Africa project. His team included Prabith Kalathil, Shane Perrier, Pooja Bal, Gaurav Joshi and Saurabh Bali. They had completed their analysis of the situation at The Banking Association, and the results clearly showed that there was a need to restructure the organisation and that an effective performance management system should be put in place to enable The Banking Association to achieve its objectives. The challenge was how to do this without unnecessarily alienating The Banking Association employees, and this was one of the key points on their agenda for discussion.</p>		
<p>Office of the Banking Adjudicator: Walking the Tightrope</p>	<p>2003</p>	<p>Organisational Design & Development</p>
<p>External changes in the banking environment, coupled with an increasing number of consumer complaints, prompted the need for new systems within the Office of the Banking Adjudicator. Neville Melville, who was appointed as the Banking Adjudicator in May 2000, had implemented fairly far-reaching changes to the office in order to comply with its new rules of procedure and to increase its capacity. Two years later, Melville wondered whether he had done enough to create an organisation that was as good as the best internationally. His aim was to build an office that would act as a catalyst for proactive change within the banking system, particularly in areas of customer service and market conduct.</p>		
<p>Umsinsi Health Care: Employees as Partners - Is the Time Right at Umsinsi Health Care?</p>	<p>2013</p>	<p>Organisational Design & Development , Strategy, Human Resources</p>

<p>Ever since she had started Umsinsi Health Care (Pty) Ltd in South Africa in November 2008, Amanda Wilde’s vision had been to place the company, which distributed medical devices, in a trust for all of her employees. When this happened, they would become full partners in the company. However, by August 2013, Wilde was still the sole guardian of the Umsinsi Partnership Trust. She had postponed transferring the trust to her employees until the business was financially stable. With financial stability achieved, Wilde was now concerned whether her employees were ready to take on the responsibilities that came with the benefits of being full partners.</p>		
STRATEGY & LEADERSHIP		
African Bank Investments Ltd: Breaking through Microfinance Frontiers	2007	Strategy
<p>By May 2007, African Bank Investments Limited (ABIL) had, under the leadership of Leon Kirkinis, become one of the predominant players in the provision of financial credit services to the mass employed population of South Africa. Over the years it had worked very hard to attain the position of market leader in the microcredit industry (with an estimated 31% of total industry loans) using a focused cost differentiation strategy that had enabled the company to achieve the lowest cost to income ratio (27%) in the industry.</p> <p>Kirkinis was proud of ABIL’s achievements to date. However, he was concerned about what the bank could do to improve its competitive edge and extend its reach in the face of its major future challenge: taking advantage of the largely untapped but highly lucrative, small-, medium- and micro- enterprise (SMME) sector of the market.</p>		
Another Hotel on Route 62: Room for a Niche?	2018	Strategy
<p>In late 2017, Wits Business School MBA student, Bulelani Moyo, pondered all the information he had gathered for a proposal he was considering putting to Jeff Miller, CEO of South African venture capital company Grovest, for investing in a new and innovative hotel concept in three locations on Cape Route 62 (Route 62), a tourist route covering parts of the Western Cape and Eastern Cape. He believed that there could be scope for a disruptive hotel model on that route. However, for such a hotel to be viable, it was crucial to target the right audience. Moyo was contemplating whether there were opportunities in four customer segments: the “ageing biker”, the “millennial adventurer”, the “foreign road-tripper” and the “travelling salesman”. As he read through his research, he wondered whether he had enough to be able to make a convincing case for any of these markets to Miller.</p>		
Brian Bruce: New Century Leader	2009	Strategy, Leadership
<p>In July 2008, Brian Bruce, chief executive of the 106-year-old construction, mining, engineering and manufacturing giant Murray & Roberts, had been at the helm for eight years. His leadership has resulted in a steady and remarkable change in the character of the group, as well as its fortunes. At the time of his appointment in July 2000, the share price had slumped 96% to 300 cents on the JSE Limited. In his words, “the company was dying.” Bruce embarked on an extended initiative, to reposition the group in the construction economy of South Africa and the world. Eight years later, Murray & Roberts is South Africa’s leading construction company and a major global player in its field. The group jumped to 48th position in the <i>Financial Mail</i> Top Performing Companies in 2008, up from 57th position in 2007. This monograph examines Brian Bruce’s leadership style and philosophy.</p>		
Business Process Outsourcing and Offshoring: Could Yahluma Compete?	2013	Strategy
<p>In January 2009, young entrepreneurs Ayanda Qunu and Thembi Bhayi abandoned their plans to start a fully owned contact centre, Yahluma Solutions Ltd, in Buffalo City in the Eastern Cape, South Africa. Even with the assistance of a financial incentive from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) to encourage the establishment of business process outsourcing and offshoring (BPO&O) businesses, they asked themselves: could they have competed globally and locally? Was their decision to abandon their plans correct?</p>		
Cape Herb & Spice Company: Choosing a Growth Strategy	2008	Strategy
<p>Irene Ivy-Schuurmans and Dale Kneen started the Cape Herb and Spice Company in 1992, selling their wares from a modest barrow at the Cape Town Waterfront. They were housemates with full-time jobs, but both were passionate about cooking “wacky, creative and unusual” gourmet food with interesting herbs and spices that weren’t commercially available.</p> <p>“It was while hunting for a specific herb for a specific dish we wanted to make that we stumbled onto this idea for a business,” recalls Kneen. “We thought it was unlikely we were the only foodies out there who wanted the perfect herb or spice, or combination of them, to make the perfect dish.”</p>		

<p>So the Cape Herb and Spice Company (CH&SC) was launched, and Ivy-Schuurmans and Dale Kneen began locating and selling those speciality herbs that were so difficult to find. They never imagined then that 14 years later, they would have an international, multi-million rand company and that this once-small business would reach a stage where it could go one of two very diverse ways: keep up its speciality status or become a mass producer of herbs and spices.</p> <p>Ivy-Schuurmans, now the new product development director, and Dale Kneen, who heads up the procurement department, are yet undecided, but know that the wrong decision could be the death-knell for their business.</p>		
<p>Capitec Bank: Low-Cost Banking for Joe Average</p>	2006	Strategy, Marketing
<p>By December 2006, Capitec Bank, South Africa's newest listed retail bank, had come a long way from its origins as a microlending organisation in 2001. Over time it had started introducing other banking services to its entry-level clients, so that by 2006 it offered all basic banking services. Capitec's chief executive for marketing and corporate affairs, Carl Fischer, considered the organisation's strategic plan for 2007: to position itself as a proper bank in a much broader target market. He realised that the key to survival for a low-cost bank in South Africa lay in high volumes, but still wrestled with the question of how Capitec could overcome the current perception that it was a niche bank in order to attract the volumes it needed to compete successfully.</p>		
<p>DiscoveryWorld: Web Strategy Reality Check</p>	2003	Strategy, Information & Knowledge Management
<p>It was December 2000 and John Robertson, the chief information officer (CIO) of Discovery, a healthcare finance and life insurance company, had to decide what to do with DiscoveryWorld, the group's ecommerce problem child. The project had been conceived at the end of 1999, in the full flush of dotcom optimism. Now the project was a source of ever-increasing conflict and dissension within the group. Operating as a separate division that reported directly to the board, it was gobbling money and rubbing other members of the group up the wrong way with an arrogant and dismissive attitude. Moreover, DiscoveryWorld had not delivered on its promises, although there was definite potential in some of the functionality that it was developing. There had been high expectations of DiscoveryWorld when it started out, but the devil seemed to be in the implementation. Was the project worth salvaging? If so, what was the best way to do this?</p>		
<p>Dolly Mokgatle: Catching the Next Train</p>	2005	Strategy, Leadership
<p>It was nearing the end of March 2005. Dolly Mokgatle had surprised the nation by resigning as chief executive of South Africa's rail utility, Spoornet, at the beginning of the year, only eighteen months into her five-year contract. The press had speculated wildly about the causes of her resignation. The words of the new Transnet CEO, Maria Ramos, had been particularly cutting. "We want people to be committed and work hard," she had said. "There is no space in Transnet for 'half measures'."</p> <p>Before Mokgatle had taken up the post at Spoornet, she had felt that everything that had happened in her life and career to date had led her to that position. She had led a very successful change process in the transmission division of South Africa's electricity utility, Eskom. It had not been easy for her to resign from Spoornet. Now, almost three months had passed since her decision to leave and she felt that she needed to take stock of the lessons that she had learnt about leadership, management and herself from this experience.</p>		
<p>Exel Petroleum: Fuel for Black Economic Empowerment</p>	2016	Strategy, BEE
<p>In July 1997, Maurice Radebe moved from a successful, eight-year career at Shell Oil South Africa to take up the position of retail manager at Exel Petroleum, a black economic empowerment (BEE) company newly started by energy and chemical company Sasol Oil and a consortium of black shareholders. His career prospects at Shell had been good. But South Africa was at an interesting juncture in its history, spirits were high because of the successful 1994 elections, and BEE was in its infancy. Radebe was intrigued about the opportunities in this new space and felt impelled to explore them further. Sitting in his sparsely furnished office in Rivonia (north of Johannesburg), Radebe wondered how to ensure the success of a new venture that would have to compete against the major global oil brands.</p>		
<p>FirstRand: Finding its path into the Indian market</p>	2016	Strategy
<p>In February 2008, eight months after FirstRand Limited sent Stephan Claassen to India to gather insights for a market-entry strategy into that country – the initial preference being to set up as a retail bank – Claassen presented a strategy to the board that focused on setting up as a corporate investment bank in the Africa-India corridor. He knew he had done well in convincing FirstRand's board of the strategy, but now wondered about other opportunities that would present themselves, and how the team in India would incorporate them into what would become FirstRand Bank India.</p>		
<p>FirstRand: Finding its path into the Indian market (Epilogue)</p>	2016	Strategy

FirstRand Limited in South Africa gave its full support to Stephan Claassen, Dr Theunie Lategan, Rohit Wahi, Mahendran Moodley and the team in India to proceed with the Africa-India corridor corporate investment bank, with the understanding that they should do what they could to develop other markets at a later date. With the go-ahead, the team finalised and sent their banking licence application to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).		
Hartmann Southern Africa: Keeping Healthcare Moving Forward	2018	Strategy, Innovation
<p>In September 2016, Wits Business School MBA student, Rishka Reddy, was reviewing the information she had gathered for a proposal she was considering putting to Andreas Joehle, chief executive officer (CEO) of the Paul Hartmann Group, a leading international supplier of medical, hygiene and healthcare products. The proposal, which she hoped would result in an internship opportunity at Hartmann, presented Reddy's strategy on how Hartmann could best expand into sub-Saharan Africa.</p> <p>While Reddy reviewed her notes, the question at the forefront of her mind was how, with an available budget of R500 million, to develop an innovation strategy that aligned with Hartmann's global goals and values, while considering the unique context of operating in sub-Saharan Africa.</p>		
JL Zwane: Corporate Social Responsibility meets Social Entrepreneur	2008	Strategy, Leadership
<p>It was October 2007 and more than 13 years had elapsed since South Africa's first non-racial, democratic elections. Social entrepreneur Reverend Spiwo Xapile sat in his immaculate office at the J L Zwane centre, located on the corner of NY2 and NY7 in Gugulethu. He reflected with pride on what he had built up over the past 17 years. His congregation had grown from a handful of people to over 2000 members, and the centre attached to the church ran a number of programmes which benefited the Gugulethu community at large.</p> <p>While much of the funding for the running of the centre and the church came from Christians elsewhere in the world, particularly the USA, local businesses had also donated large amounts of money to build the centre in the early 2000s. In addition, a very important relationship established early on with Stellenbosch University had been vital to the success of the centre. Yet Xapile believed that business and previously disadvantaged communities were still not speaking the same language as each other, nor were they understanding one another properly.</p> <p>He pondered a number of important questions: how to create the right environment for meaningful dialogue to take place between business and communities, how to develop the skills within his own community that would ensure the sustainability of the centre, as well as the question of succession and grooming a new leader to take over from him when the time arose.</p>		
Kalahari.net: Achieving Growth in a Limited Market	2005	Strategy, Marketing
<p>It was February 2005 and in the past six years kalahari.net's customer base had grown from 9 000 to just under 250 000. As such it was one of South Africa's largest e-tailers. Since 2001 the company had diversified out of selling only books and music, to include films, gaming, travel, wine, magazine subscriptions, electronics and other products.</p> <p>Now, Hein Pretorius, CEO of kalahari.net, and his team of 49 employees faced the challenge of the declining prices of CDs and DVDs, which was having a markedly negative impact on the financials of the company. In reality this meant that, while keeping prices competitive with the broader retail market, kalahari.net needed to up its sales considerably to compensate for the lower prices and reach its former gross profit margins. Pretorius believed that retail, whether it be on- or off-line was purely a volumes game. So, what could kalahari.net do to up its sales volumes?</p>		
Kgosi Leruo Molotlegi: Traditional Leadership in a Modern Democracy	2004	Strategy, Leadership
<p>Kgosi Leruo Molotlegi became leader of the Bafokeng tribe in April 2000 upon the untimely death of his eldest brother. Unlike many other South African tribes, the Bafokeng had real title to the land they inhabited, and underneath this land were rich deposits of platinum. The Bafokeng received royalties from the two mining companies that mined this platinum and were involved in a business relationship with these houses. As a result, the leadership of the Kgosi encompassed more than just the community issues. It encompassed business issues as well.</p> <p>It was difficult to keep a balance between the two. Serving the people was the foundation of leadership for the Kgosi, who was well aware that a king was only a king through his people. His absolute priority, therefore, was to ensure that he carried the people along with him in every decision that he made: both those that related to the community and those that related to its business interests. How was he to maintain the necessary balance and ensure that all of his constituencies received the attention they deserved?</p>		
Laurie Dippenaar: Corporate Entrepreneur	2004	Strategy, Leadership

<p>By 2004, Laurie Dippenaar had been at the helm of FirstRand, one of the largest financial services groups in South Africa, for six years. He was chairman of two of the companies within the FirstRand group the Momentum Group Limited and Discovery, both of which operated in the life and health insurance market.</p> <p>In early 2004, Discovery had come up with an idea for an investment product that was a paradigm shift away from what was currently offered in the market and Dippenaar believed it had huge potential. The immediate question was whether to allow Discovery to proceed with its new product, as it would compete directly with the products offered by Momentum. The real issue was that FirstRand had two horses in one race, and he wondered whether the current situation was sustainable.</p>		
Lechabile: IT as a People Business	1999	Strategy
<p>In Lechabile, a small black empowerment IT company, a two-fold strategic issue had to be resolved: how the numerous growth opportunities that presented themselves should be managed; and how options for achieving growth should be evaluated. Concomitant with this, the number of employees was increasing. Management felt that a formal performance management system was needed that would be in keeping with their culture of empowerment.</p>		
LeisureNet: An Unfit Empire	2003	Strategy, Ethics, Corporate Governance
<p>On the evening of 6 October 2002 'Mr Fix-It', Peter Flack, a partner in Coronation FRM, a firm of corporate turnaround specialists, was preparing for his testimony at the hearing into the collapse of LeisureNet, a company with the majority of its interests in the fitness industry. LeisureNet had been placed under provisional liquidation exactly two years ago, with contingent liabilities of almost R1 billion. Flack, in his capacity as acting CEO at the time, had been involved in making that final decision to close down the company. At the time, it was the biggest corporate crash ever in South Africa. The question of what exactly had gone wrong at LeisureNet was certain to be raised the next day at the hearing.</p>		
Lumkani: Rapid Dentention of Fires in Informal Settlements	207	Strategy
<p>In mid-2017, David Gluckman, director of Lumkani, contemplated the company's next strategic move. Lumkani, a South African start-up company, manufactured an early-warning fire detection system designed for shack-dwellers in informal settlements, with the aim of reducing deaths and damage due to fire in those communities.</p>		
Maanda Manyatshe: A South African Postal Revolution	2004	Strategy, Leadership
<p>Maanda Manyatshe, CEO of the South African Post Office, put the phone back in its cradle. He had just been speaking to a few of his prospective colleagues at MTN South Africa, the cellular network company he would soon be joining. MTN SA was the second largest cellular operator in the country. He would be tasked with growing the South African operation. It was only one of a number of offers he had received, and it was not the most attractive package he had been offered. But, as he prepared to continue discussing the launch of several new electronic mail products, he wondered whether he had made the right choice.</p>		
Management Consulting and SAB: At What Price, Advice?	1999	Strategy
<p>Marketing manager at South African Breweries, Trevor Hughes, investigated how best, to meet the needs of both an established, sophisticated market and, at the same time, the markets in townships and rural areas. He had hired a consultancy firm which had not produced results. He wanted to prevent a repeat failure. A number of dilemmas had to be addressed to ensure 'value for money'. Hughes pondered over which firm he should hire, wondering whether he should give preference to a local firm, or an international one that had a long working history with SAB. How could he measure success?</p>		
Maria Ramos: Transforming Transnet Strategy	2009	Strategy, Leadership
<p>It was 21 February 2006. Maria Ramos, CEO of Transnet, one of the largest parastatals in South Africa, was facing a strike by the unions, representing more than 85 000 people. After consulting government and key customers, the Transnet board had chosen to cut away those of its businesses not associated with freight transport after the government, its sole shareholder, had given it a mandate to reduce the cost of doing business.</p> <p>The memorandum given by the unions to Alec Erwin, the Minister of Public Enterprises, stated that they were embarking on rolling mass action in protest against "unilateral decision-making, unilateral implementation, undermining and disrespecting labour and its members". It said: "Labour wishes to place on record the following: We remain ideologically opposed to privatisation of strategic public assets which can benefit the masses of our people, the workers and the economy as a whole particularly infrastructure delivery, training and job retention and creation." It declared that the unions were "absolutely right to insist on a genuine process of negotiation over the restructuring of the Transnet Group."</p>		

<p>Strike action had started in the Eastern Cape on 13 February. The Northern Cape and Western Cape followed suit on 14 February. Transnet workers in Gauteng, North West, Mpumalanga and Limpopo had then joined the protests on 20 February.</p> <p>Ramos and Pradeep Maharaj, Transnet's group executive of strategy, were reviewing COSATU's statement, which declared: "The unions are absolutely right to insist on a genuine process of negotiation over the restructuring of the Transnet Group, including proposals to privatise Freight dynamics, the Transnet Pension Fund Administration, Autopax and the Blue Train, and plans to transfer SAA, Metrorail and Shosholozha Meyl out of Transnet and to move other business units within Transnet. They looked at each other. Had they made the right strategic decisions?"</p>		
<p>Massmart Beyond Mark Lamberti</p>	2004	Strategy, Entrepreneurship
<p>Under Mark Lamberti's leadership, mass retailer, Massmart's turnover had exceeded R20 billion in turnover for the first time in its history in 2004. It had a watershed year in terms of numbers as no mass merchant in the history of South Africa had achieved the return on sales that Massmart had in that year. Lamberti had been at the helm of Massmart since he founded the company in 1990. But now, bearing in mind his desire not to renew his employment contract as CEO when it expired in 2007, Lamberti was concerned about how to facilitate a seamless leadership transition while retaining the talent and maintaining the motivation of his exceptional management team.</p>		
<p>Mavuso Msimang: Turning SITA Around</p>	2005	Strategy
<p>It was January 2005, more than one year after Mavuso Msimang had accepted the position as CEO of the State Information and Technology Agency (SITA). In its five years of existence, SITA had experienced tumultuous times and had been accused of poor service delivery, mismanagement and corruption. In 15 months Msimang had laid the groundwork for a turnaround and he believed that SITA was now finally on the road to recovery. Still, there was some way to go before the organisation was functioning optimally. Was he on the right track, he wondered.</p>		
<p>Metrorail: Building on the Success of 2010</p>	2013	Strategy
<p>It was June 2011 and South African passenger rail company, Metrorail, was celebrating its success in moving passengers during the 2010 FIFA World Cup™. The organisation had done much to improve its infrastructure, safety and image for the event. Now Lucky Montana, group chief executive officer (CEO) of the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) – the state-owned enterprise that owned Metrorail – considered what the organisation should do to ensure that Metrorail become the preferred, regular transport service for thousands of daily commuters still using taxis or their own cars.</p>		
<p>Netflorist: Maintaining Momentum</p>	2008	Strategy, Entrepreneurship
<p>Netflorist managing director Ryan Bacher's wife always gets flowers for Valentine's Day. His mother always gets some for Mother's Day. But neither sees him for days around those periods. His head is buried in flowers and gifts, and his mind is racing ahead to ensure that no bouquets are dropped.</p> <p>When Bacher was involved in establishing Netflorist, the company had the normal teething problems of building a business, but it didn't have to worry about local online competition. Now, business is doing really well – but it has about 50 competitors, and the numbers are growing daily. In this environment, Bacher's challenge is to ensure that Netflorist stays on top of its game. Just how to do this is something that occupies his mind as he comes into work every day.</p>		
<p>Pick n Pay: Changing its Environmental Footprint</p>	2008	Strategy, Environmental Sustainability
<p>Pick n Pay's initial steps to address environmental issues in the 1980s culminated in 2007 with the launch of its Sustainable Development Vision and Action Plan. Although the plan commits the organisation to a number of environmentally-friendly goals, a particular focus is on reducing carbon emissions. Pick n Pay has identified climate change, and the carbon emissions that are contributing to the global phenomenon, as presenting a risk not only to the business, but to broader sustainability as well. The plan commits the organisation to reducing its overall carbon footprint – and specifically its energy consumption – by 20% per square metre of trading space by 2012 (based on 2007 baseline figures).</p> <p>At the same time, however, the company intends to increase its trading footprint by 12% a year over the same period. The biggest challenge for Tessa Chamberlain, general manager for sustainable development at Pick n Pay, lies in the conundrum of balancing these two goals. Can Pick n Pay achieve both, or will achieving one goal necessarily compromise the other?</p>		
<p>Pravin Gordhan: Master Juggler</p>	2007	Strategy, Leadership
<p>Pravin Gordhan, Commissioner of the South African Revenue Services (SARS), had managed to improve tax collection substantially over his six years of office, whilst also managing to keep changing the institution internally. He was proud of the leadership role he had played in making such a complex public organisation operate efficiently.</p>		

He knew, however, that large organisations increasingly perceived SARS to be overplaying its hand. In his view the key to improving the level of tax compliance – which was only at the 50% mark – was to enhance mutual trust, but he wondered what was the most effective way of doing this.		
Public Private Partnership (PPPs)	2006	Strategy
This is a background note on Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in South Africa. The note defines and explains PPPs as an alternative service delivery option for the public sector, highlighting the legislation that governs PPPs and the Project Cycle. The debate for and against the PPP option for service delivery and PPP performance are examined.		
Rob Angel: Leading Engen to Empowerment	1999	Strategy, Leadership
In November 1998, Rob Angel experienced a major challenge. As CEO of Engen, he had spent almost a decade working on the transformation of the largest South African oil company into a successful, empowered organisation. Petronas, a Malaysian state-owned oil company, had recently taken over Engen. Engen was considering a merger with Sasol Oil, a South African state-owned oil company. Both Petronas and Sasol, adhered strongly to the old command and control leadership culture. In addition, it was planned that a considerable percentage of Engen would be transformed to a black empowerment company. This presented a different dimension of South African culture. Rob Angel considered how he could maintain Engen’s culture of empowerment after the Petronas take-over.		
SA Metal Group: Could Bigger be Better?	2011	Strategy
In November 2010, Clifford Barnett – director and co-owner of family business, SA Metal Group (SA Metal) – put his hard hat down on his desk, looked out on the busy scrapyards below his window in Epping, Cape Town and pondered the company’s growth. In 2001, the company had expanded to Gauteng, and its operations there were fast exceeding his expectations. The question confronting him was multifaceted, given the high standards achieved by SA Metal in the Cape. Barnett knew that the company stood on the brink of growth from medium to large in size in an increasingly competitive national and international market. How were he and his brother – managing director Graham Barnett – to achieve the transition in size while, at the same time, retaining the company’s nature as a family business, its ethos of good customer service, its unique human capital formula, its ethical values and its financial success?		
Sandton City: Looking for a Sustainable Power Solution	2008	Strategy, Environmental Sustainability
In May 2008, Johannesburg’s Sandton City shopping complex was on the road to recovery from its experience that January, when it was hit hardest of all shopping centres in the country by Eskom’s random power cuts. Sandton City general manager, Gary Vipond, and Dorcas Ledwaba, the director of property management at Liberty Life Properties, which owns the complex, had managed to find ways of saving electricity, and had put a solution in place involving generators and inverters. Planned power cuts had taken place for a short period in April, but Eskom had since announced that it would cease planned power cuts and would try to provide continuous power. Yet the two knew that the electricity situation was still critical. They wondered whether the short-term solutions they had implemented would serve the shopping complex effectively until 2014, when Eskom envisaged being on track again.		
Sasol/AECI: The Right Chemistry for a Merger?	2000	Strategy
A number of factors affected the chemicals and plastics industry in South Africa during the late 1990s. With South Africa’s acceptance into the global economy after the election of a democratic government in 1994, a new export oriented strategy was implemented to increase international competitiveness. Sasol consulted with the Competition Board in 1998 in order to gain approval of a merger with AECI. The merger was expected to bring about economies of scale and to create a globally competitive explosives giant within the South African borders.		
Sir Sam E Jonah: Leading in Africa	2005	Strategy, Leadership
Sir Sam Jonah joined Ghana’s Ashanti Goldfields in 1970. He climbed the corporate ladder, occupying every position on the rung along the way, as the first black and youngest person in every position he held. In 1986, he was offered the opportunity to be the first Ghanaian to occupy the position of chief executive of Ashanti, and began to build his dream: an African company run by Africans in Africa, with the best person for the job, in every position. Through acquisition, Jonah grew Ashanti from a single mine to the world’s ninth largest gold company with 25 operations in 11 countries. Ashanti became “Africa’s favourite son.”		

In February 2003, Bobby Godsell, his good friend and chief executive of South African mining giant AngloGold Limited, proposed the idea of uniting his company with Jonah's. Eleven months later the biggest merger on the African continent was concluded and AngloGold Ashanti was formed. However, as the new company's president, Jonah's new job of identifying growth opportunities for AngloGold Ashanti kept him removed from the operational problems that once occupied his time. Now June 2005, Jonah was preparing to report back to Godsell after returning from another business development trip. His frustration had been mounting. He wondered whether it was time to move on.		
South African Airways (SAA): Navigating Turbulent Skies	2013	Strategy
In April 2010, Siza Mzimela was appointed as chief executive officer (CEO) of the government-owned South African Airways (Pty) Ltd (SAA). She was the seventh CEO to be appointed since 1993. As far back as 2007, the South African government had issued the airline with an ultimatum – 'get your affairs in order or you are on your own'. Yet the airline was still in a financially disastrous position. Mzimela knew that she had to come up with a workable strategy for SAA, and wondered what the organisation had to do to turn itself around.		
Strategising to Keep Otis SA at the Top	2000	Strategy, Marketing
Bonang Mohale, managing director of Otis South Africa, was challenged with the transformation of the organisation from a product-oriented company into a world class, market oriented and competitive concern in the business of elevators and escalators. Although sales had increased and the company remained profitable, growth had been lower than the rate of inflation. Competition had intensified, and customers were better informed and more demanding; yet staff were complacent. Mohale was wondering how his team should approach the development of a marketing strategy for Otis so as to avoid losing its competitive edge as market leader.		
Stride Pharmaceuticals: Employment Equity for Corporate Performance	2001	Strategy, Human Resources
Barbara Care, human resources director of Stride Pharmaceuticals, had invested considerable effort during the past few years, developing sound human resources practices and ensuring that the company complied with the labour legislation of South Africa. The promulgation of the Employment Equity Act in 1998 presented the company with new challenges. Care still had major concerns about its ultimate success beyond the purely legislative requirements. She considered how employment equity could become integral to the strategy of the company.		
The AngloGold-Ashanti Merger Case Series (A) Choosing a Merger Target	2005	Strategy
In February 2002, Johannesburg-based AngloGold Ltd lost its position as No1 gold producer to America's Newmont Gold Corporation when Newmont outbid AngloGold in a merger deal with Australia's largest gold company, Normandy Mining Ltd. Urgently, AngloGold had to find other ways of surviving the industry's dwindling resources. Now, on the evening of 3 September 2002, Paul Dennison, AngloGold's business development analyst, was considering the options for presentation to the chief executive, Bobby Godsell, in the morning.		
The AngloGold-Ashanti Merger Case Series (B) Winning Hearts and Minds	2006	Strategy
Having met in London with Sir Sam Jonah, chief executive of Ashanti, in September 2002, Bobby Godsell, chief executive of AngloGold, announced on 16 April 2003 that discussions with Ashanti regarding a proposed merger had commenced. By August 2003, merger discussions were proceeding as planned, when the shock entry of Randgold Resources as a competitive bidder forced AngloGold to reassess its strategy.		
The battle for Ashanti between Randgold (with a market capitalisation of \$600 million, less than half that of Ashanti's \$1.28 billion) and AngloGold (market capitalisation of \$8.2 billion) was a real-life "David versus Goliath" fight, which captured the public's attention. While AngloGold's bid (\$1.1 billion) came with technical competence, Randgold Resources, with a "huge" offer of \$1.46 billion, appealed to people's emotions and sense of national pride. At the beginning of October 2003, it was still unclear when the Ghanaian government would make its decision. Paul Dennison, AngloGold's manager of mergers and acquisitions, needed to advise CEO Bobby Godsell on the best course of action.		
The AngloGold-Ashanti Merger Case Series (C) The Integration	2009	Strategy
On 20 February 2004, Ghana's parliament approved the merger between AngloGold and Ashanti Goldfields Company (Ashanti) and, on 26 April 2004 – a year after Bobby Godsell announced that negotiations had commenced – the parties concluded the details of the arrangement. It was the largest such deal ever on the African continent, and was widely considered a triumph for Africa.		

<p>In October 2007, when Australian Mark Cutifani succeeded Godsell as chief executive of AngloGold Ashanti, the African empire had seen the departure of Sir Sam Jonah and several years of turmoil in the Ghana operations – and specifically Obuasi, the mine with the deep-level ore bodies that had originally attracted AngloGold’s interest. Faced with declining productivity, financial losses and low morale at the Obuasi mine, Cutifani had three options: close the mine; sell it to a willing buyer; or intervene to give it a last chance.</p>		
<p>The AngloGold-Ashanti Merger Case Series (D) Randgold Resources</p>	<p>2006</p>	<p>Strategy</p>
<p>Having secured the approval of Ashanti’s management team and major shareholder, Lonmin, AngloGold’s strategy for getting the Ghanaian government (as shareholder and regulator), and the over required proportion of institutional and retail shareholders on board centred around demonstrating that the transaction would add value to all stakeholders. However, Steve Lenahan, AngloGold’s corporate officer of corporate affairs, needed to reassess his campaign strategy following the surprise entry of competing bid.</p>		
<p>The AngloGold-Ashanti Merger Case Series (E) The Light at the End of the Tunnel</p>	<p>2006</p>	<p>Strategy</p>
<p>On 15 October 2003, AngloGold increased its offer to around \$1.48 billion, only for it to be countered by Randgold Resources’ bid of \$1.7 billion a week later. The Ghanaian government rejected Randgold Resources’ offer on 28 October 2003, when it publicly announced that it backed AngloGold. However, the deal still to be approved by Ghana’s parliament, the date for which had not been set, Dennison’s next recommendation to Godsell would be on whether value would still be extracted if the process continued indefinitely.</p>		
<p>The Johannesburg Hospital: Of Oaths and Opportunity Costs</p>	<p>2004</p>	<p>Strategy, Organisational Design & Development</p>
<p>It was a Sunday evening in March 2004 and Sagie Pillay, chief executive officer of the Johannesburg Hospital, was reflecting on the progress he had made since his appointment in 2000. He had been instrumental in crafting the Hospital Strategy Project for the National Department of Health. He had been appointed to transform the Johannesburg Hospital in accordance with this strategy. Now, in 2004, he was as supportive of health and public sector policies as he had been when he took over as CEO, but had experienced the reality of implementation.</p> <p>Every decision was a balancing act between the priorities of the national and provincial governments, health policy, accountability for public funds, constitutional rights and providing the best possible care for each patient. In addition, he was confronted daily with public service organisational culture, a shrinking budget allocation and the increasing number of South Africans being driven from private health care to the more affordable public health care facilities.</p> <p>He had made some progress, but it had been an uphill battle. How could he or any future CEO take the hospital forward and achieve the goals of a National Health System?</p>		
<p>The JSE/BESA Merger: Navigating the Integration Minefield</p>	<p>2010</p>	<p>Strategy, Human Resources, Organisational Design & Development</p>
<p>A few days before the JSE Limited (JSE) and the Bond Exchange of South Africa Limited (BESA) merged on 22 June 2009, Nicky Newton-King, deputy CEO of the JSE, –who had been tasked with leading the integration of the two organisations – reviewed what she had done so far and the plans she had put in place to ensure a smooth integration. A great deal of time and work had been invested in planning and organising the merger, and she did not want a misstep in the integration process to derail the entire merger. She wondered if she had done enough to ensure a smooth integration.</p>		
<p>The Stokvel Sector: Opportunities and Challenges</p>	<p>2009</p>	<p>Strategy</p>
<p>By 2009, stokvels (community-based savings clubs) were playing a substantial role in the South African economy. A 2003 study entitled ‘Stokvels: Making Social Cents’, conducted by the University of Cape Town (UCT) Unilever Institute of Strategic Marketing, found that black adults in South Africa invested approximately R12 billion a year in stokvels, burial societies, <i>mogodisanos</i> and saving blocks.</p> <p>The UCT study revealed that, at the time, 2.5 million South African adults (that is 9% of the adult population of the country) – and one in every two black adults – belonged to a stokvel (burial societies excluded). One year earlier, a 2002 survey conducted by Futurefact had reported that there were 3.5 million stokvel members, and had estimated the reach of burial societies to be much higher – 89 000 societies, with 8 million members.</p> <p>Further research in 2007 by the financial services group Old Mutual (OM) had indicated that “grey money holdings” – OM’s term for informal savings circulating outside the formal financial sector – had grown to R33 billion over the last decade. It was black communities’ savings, which were held through stokvels, that accounted for the majority of grey money.</p>		

Thus, as a group, stokvels presented an apparently attractive market for private sector organisations. According to two key role players in the industry – Andrew Lukhele, founder president of the National Stokvels Association of South Africa (NASASA), and Santy Mokgoatsane, business development manager of the Stokvel Company, which had also been set up with the intention of organising and empowering stokvels – there was a need at the same time for certain stokvels to organise themselves more formally so as to create wealth for themselves – either as formal financial institutions or as small businesses that had the potential to grow.		
The Times: Bridging the Old with the New	2009	Strategy, Marketing, Entrepreneurship
It was April 2007, and Ray Hartley still had myriad unanswered questions in the lead-up to the launch of a new daily newspaper, <i>The Times</i> , in June 2007. As the editor, he debated whether the paper, with its online functionality, would be targeting a brand new market or actually be merely an extension of <i>The Sunday Times</i> ' existing market of over 130 000 subscribers. Resolving this question would inform many still uncertain issues, such as what form the daily paper would assume, its predicted performance relative to established daily papers, content compilation and, perhaps most importantly, whether it would generate an online market.		
Tom Boardman: The Leader Agile Learner	2017	Strategy, Leadership
Tom Boardman learnt volumes when he created and sold Boardmans (the store) in the 1980s, and when he led Nedbank from an ailing organisation, through its turnaround in the early and mid-2000s, to one of the top banks in 2010. In May 2016, Kinnevik, a listed Swedish investment company, appointed Boardman as chairman – he had been a director since 2011. Kinnevik was in a strong financial position and Boardman pondered his reasons for accepting the challenge of being chairman, abandoning any thoughts of retiring at nearly 70 years of age. What could he bring to this position?		
TopTV: Changing the Face of the South African Pay-TV Landscape?	2013	Strategy
In May 2011, Vino Govender, CEO of the Johannesburg-based On Digital Media's (ODM) TopTV, felt pleased about the 200 000 subscribers that had been secured in less than one year in the competitive South African satellite pay television (pay-TV) market. When TopTV commenced services on 1 May 2010, MultiChoice's DStv had been the dominant player for 15 years. TopTV made a calculated decision to target clients who had not been able to afford pay-TV. This included 60% of South Africans who wanted wholesome, family entertainment but were not particularly interested in sport, which was a major part of DStv's offering. TopTV had since extended its target market to include the LSM 6–9 income bracket. Nonetheless, Govender wondered whether this repositioning was sustainable enough to compete successfully in the long run. What strategy, he wondered, should he follow to attract and keep a larger target audience to ensure future growth?		
Vodacom m-pesa: 'Mobilising' Cash in a Challenging Market	2012	Strategy, Marketing
In March 2012, Mark Taylor, managing executive for Online and Vodacom m-pesa, reflected on the 19 months since the launch of m-pesa, Vodacom's mobile payment platform. M-pesa was a partnership between the South African mobile telecommunications company, the Vodacom Group, and the Nedbank Group Limited. In a country with high cellphone penetration and more than 15 million unbanked South Africans' slower than expected uptake was surprising. Taylor was nonetheless convinced that m-pesa had potential – but for it to succeed, he had to find ways to overcome the challenges of making mobile money work in a country like South Africa.		
Wendy Lucas-Bull: Making a Difference	2005	Strategy, Leadership
Wendy Lucas-Bull's career was taking on an entirely new direction. She had spent the last 10 years working in various capacities for FirstRand, one of South Africa's largest financial services groups – most recently as CEO of the group's retail financial services businesses. As such, she had been responsible for the biggest division within the FirstRand banking group. Now, in October 2004, she had decided to branch off on her own and to apply her skills to making a difference in South African society through a threefold process of (1) fostering partnerships between business, government and civil society; (2) advocacy amongst businesspeople in regard to developing sustainable businesses; and (3) advocacy around using black economic empowerment as a means of achieving business sustainability. Lucas-Bull thought the timing was right: South Africa was experiencing a new patriotism, as well as growing business confidence, which would make people more open to her ideas. But would succeed in achieving her vision?		
Wendy Luhabe: On the Boardwalk	2004	Strategy, Leadership

<p>Wendy Luhabe, who had been voted “South Africa’s most powerful business woman measured in terms of influence, not wealth” by one of South Africa’s most respected business magazines, considered the latest offer she had received to chair the board of one of South Africa’s largest organisations. It was September 2004 and, since her first board appointment in 1996, she had served on several boards of directors – including boards of some of the biggest companies in the country. By 2004, she chaired the boards of six companies, and sat on the board of another.</p> <p>Luhabe was acutely aware of the enormous and increasing corporate governance challenges that were now faced by board members. Her workload was already quite heavy, but, at the same time, she might be able to make a contribution and share her experience in the position of chair of this board. Should she accept the offer?</p>		
Woolworths Food: High-end Retail in Tough Economic Times	2013	Strategy
<p>In February 2009, Julian Novak, Woolworths divisional director of food, announced a new strategy for the company’s food division. The South African retail sector had been affected by the global economic downturn and conditions were grim. By August 2008, Woolworths Food had already shown a drop in market share. (See Exhibit 1.) Novak’s new strategy included drastic reductions in prices and a variety of special deals and discounts. It was essential to attract lost customers back into its shops. Would Woolworths be able to do this while maintaining its quality/value proposition and its commitment to providing safe, healthy and environmentally friendly products?</p>		
Woolworths SA: Clothing Turnaround Strategy	2005	Strategy, Marketing
<p>In the 2004 financial year, for the third year in a row, the results of fashion and food retailer Woolworths were behind those of its competitors. Comparing turnover growth rates of the major sector players over the 2002 to 2004 period indicated that the Cape Town-based Woolworths had grown at an average of 13% a year as opposed to an average of almost 19% among its competitors. Woolworths clothing sales had remained static whilst those of its competitors had increased. Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Simon Susman, had to decide on a strategy to turn this around.</p>		
Woolworths SA: Making Sustainability Sustainable	2009	Strategy, Environmental Sustainability
<p>In February 2009, Justin Smith, manager of the <i>Good business journey</i> at Woolworths, a leading South African department store, was a worried man. Woolworths had launched its five-year sustainability strategy just under two years before. After undertaking an impact assessment, Smith was concerned that the original targets – which covered transformation, social development, the environment and climate change (see Exhibit 1) – had been set without a clear understanding of exactly what it would take to achieve them. Woolworths had recently identified 10 key risk areas that impacted on the achievement of its original goals. If the sustainability goals were not reached, Woolworths could lose credibility among its shareholders, staff and consumers. What did Woolworths need to do to ensure that it achieved its sustainability goals? And had the company been too ambitious in the targets it had set initially, he wondered?</p>		
Yahluma: A Sustainable Business Model?	2008	Strategy
<p>In September 2007, Pindiwe Holomisa and Nomaciko Ngoasheng, started Yahluma Solutions Ltd with the intention of building a fully-owned contact centre in Buffalo City (Eastern Cape), and making use of a Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) incentive to encourage the establishment of business process outsourcing and offshoring (BPO&O) businesses. The Buffalo City centre would take nearly a year to complete. In the meantime, client demand and the desire to earn incomes had led the two to offer part-time outsourcing services, using call centre infrastructure and facilities rented from a disaster recovery (DR) company.</p>		
OTHER		
Avis Rent-A-Car South Africa	2005	Operations management
<p>On June 23 2005, Keith Rankin, managing director of Avis Rent-A-Car Southern Africa, was preparing a proposal for the June 30 board of directors meeting. His concern was how to meet demand during the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup, given the severe space constraints at Johannesburg International Airport (JIA).</p>		
Bell Dewar and Hall: A Case of Balance	2004	Women in Business, Personal Development

<p>To the outside world, Sarah Visagie was a partner at law firm Bell Dewar & Hall (BDH). But those inside the firm knew that she was a junior partner and not an equity partner. This was largely because she felt unable to commit herself to earning the same fee targets as the other equity partners (all of whom happened to be men) on account of her family commitments and the 'shorter' hours she spent at the office. However, it had really hurt last year when a junior partner who was younger than her had leapfrogged her to the position of equity partner. The hurt had taken her by surprise – she had not expected to react in that way. How much worse would it be this year when yet more junior professionals rose above her?</p>		
<p>Eve Smith: Case Novice (A)</p>	2006	Case Teaching
<p>It was the night before Wits Business School (WBS) economics professor, Eve Smith, was to teach a case for the first time ever in her 12 years as a university lecturer. As she thought about the session the next morning, her major concerns were whether the case would achieve her objective of integrating the theory that she had presented in the previous lectures, and whether she would be able to keep the discussion focussed so that the session would cover all the necessary material.</p>		
<p>Johannesburg Hospital Pharmacy: Optimising Operations</p>	2006	Operations management
<p>In July 2006, Daleen van Schalkwyk, chief pharmacist at the Johannesburg Hospital, was preparing to move the pharmacy's outpatients department (OPD), or dispensary, from the temporary accommodation, back into its refurbished premises. The pharmacy, tainted by a history of long queues of frustrated patients, was now presented with an opportunity to change negative perceptions. However, considering the severe resource constraints of public health, her concern was how existing processes could be improved to deliver an efficient, high-quality service.</p>		
<p>Kulula.com in a Turnaround Mode</p>	2005	Operations Management
<p>It was October 2005. Commercial director of the successful low-cost South African airline, kulula.com, Gidon Novick, struggled to find a solution to the airline's flight delays which impacted negatively on its customer relations. The turnaround time of its aircraft needed to be reduced dramatically for kulula.com to stay competitive, but how could this be achieved?</p>		
<p>Mozambique and the HIPC Initiative: The Politics of Debt</p>	2001	Political Economy
<p>Planning and Finance Minister, Luisa Diogo, faced one of her most critical leadership challenges as a government official. She was charged with the negotiations for the approval of a poverty reduction strategy (PRSP), which was a condition for Mozambique receiving significant debt relief as part of a debt initiative sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. This 'heavily indebted poor countries' (HIPC) initiative was central to Mozambique's continued economic recovery. Diogo needed to ensure that progress towards economic development continued. She considered what might be the best way of achieving agreement on the poverty reduction programme, so as to secure much needed debt relief for Mozambique.</p>		
<p>MultiChoice Africa: Managing the Queue</p>	2003	Data & Decision Making
<p>MultiChoice customers and the company's senior management had asked Eddie Moyce, call centre manager for MultiChoice Africa, a multi-channel television platform, to investigate the possibility of improving the response time from the current 80:30 to 80:20 or even 90:10. Recent research had shown that while customers who had phoned the call centre were generally satisfied with the service they received, they were dissatisfied with the length of time it took for their calls to be answered. What would the impact of reducing response times be? Would it be possible to reduce response times while staying within budget. Management had recently imposed severe austerity measures on the company, even reducing the call centre's budget in the last two years.</p>		
<p>SACMEQ: Monitoring the Quality of Education in Developing Countries</p>	2012	Data & Decision Making
<p>In October 2012, Dr Kenneth Ross, professional fellow at the Graduate School of Education of the University of Melbourne in Victoria, Australia and chairperson of the Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ) Scientific Committee, was busy analysing the combined results of the SACMEQ III research conducted on the 15 participating African countries. He had to determine which factors made a difference to the quality of education in primary schools in southern and eastern Africa. The analysis would assist him in advising the ministers of education from the participating countries on which factors were most influential in the success of a primary education system in Africa.</p>		